California High-Speed Rail

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California High-Speed Rail
CAHSRA Logo.svg
San Joaquin River Viaduct under construction in 2019
San Joaquin River Viaduct under construction in 2019
Overview
OwnerCalifornia High-Speed Rail Authority
Area servedPhase 1 Initial Operating Segment:
   San Joaquin Valley (Central Valley)
Future extensions:
   San Francisco Bay Area
   Southern California
LocaleCalifornia, United States
Transit typeHigh-speed rail
Number of stations4 (Phase 1 Initial Operating Segment)
21 (entire completed system)
Chief executiveBrian P. Kelly
Website
Operation
Operation will start2029 (Initial Operating Segment)
Operator(s)DB International USA
Technical
System lengthc. 171 mi (275 km) (central leg)
c. 520 mi (840 km) (Phase 1)
c. 800 mi (1,300 km) (proposed including Phase 2)[1]
No. of tracks2 (4 in stations)
Track gauge4 ft 8+1⁄2 in (1,435 mm) standard gauge
Electrification25 kV 60 Hz AC overhead line[2][3]
Top speed220 mph (350 km/h) maximum
110 mph (180 km/h) San Francisco–Gilroy[4] & Los Angeles–Anaheim[5]

California High-Speed Rail (CAHSR or CHSR) is a publicly funded high-speed rail system currently under construction in the U.S. state of California. The California High Speed Rail Authority managing the project was established by an act of the California State Legislature, and tasked with presenting a high-speed rail plan to the voters. This plan, Proposition 1A, was approved by voters in 2008.

The project is ultimately to connect the major population centers in the north of the state (the San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento, California) through the Central Valley (California), Greater Los Angeles, and the Inland Empire to San Diego at the south end of the state.

The project is designed to be accomplished in two major phases. Phase 1 is to connect San Francisco, California (in the Bay Area) to Anaheim, California (in Greater Los Angeles). (This is a distance of about 500 miles (800 km)). A later extension in Phase 2 is to extend the north end of the Central Valley section up to Sacramento, and to extend the south end through the Inland Empire down to San Diego. (This is a total system length of about 800 miles (1,290 km)).

Current status and plans

Project plan as of February 2022. Note the current IOS is planned to ONLY run from Merced to Bakersfield. Only four stations are initially planned: Merced, Fresno, Kings/Tulare, and Bakersfield.

A current summary of the project follows. This summary is based on "Proposition 1A Factsheet" (2022), the Authority's published 2022 Business Plan, and the Peer Review Group's 2022 report to the state legislature. [1]

Due to financial (and other) constraints, even Phase 1 is too big to be done all at once, so the implementation is being divided into discrete sections. Currently the Authority is in the process of constructing a self-sustaining Initial Operating Segment in the Central Valley running from Merced, California to Bakersfield, California. (This is a distance of about 171 miles (280 km)). In the two metropolitan areas at the north and south ends of Phase 1, the Authority is currently implementing a "blended system" plan in which the HSR route uses (and inter-operates with) the local commuter rail systems. These "bookend" sections are currently being upgraded to be able to support HSR trains. The final two sections (to extend the Central Valley's IOS north and south to reach the two metropolitan areas) are the most difficult of all, since they have major mountains to traverse. Construction of these two final linking sections is not currently in progress due to funding limitations; all of the other sections do have some construction underway.

The initial estimates of the cost were too low, and there are insufficient funds available for the entire project. The Authority's plans currently indicate (in Exhibit 3.3 of the 2022 Business Plan on pg. 59) $23.4 billion in identified funding through 2030, with an additional $8 billion in funding currently sought from the Federal government. The current budget is $17.9 billion for Central Valley construction (about 119 miles (192 km)), design work for the Merced and Bakersfield extensions, the "bookend" projects now underway in the northern and southern metropolitan areas, completing the environmental clearances needed for all of Phase 1, and $4.6 to $6.0 billion for double-trackage and trainsets for the IOS.[6] The Authority indicates that sufficient funding will be available to get the IOS into operation before 2030. Proposition 1A requires that the operational segments be self-sustaining, so the Authority’s first priority is to get the IOS successfully into operation. Additional funding will be needed to get the two linking line sections (to the north first, then the south) started. Cost estimates to get the entire Phase 1 system completed (per the 2022 Business Plan, pg. 79) range from a low-estimate of $76.7 billion, to a mid-estimate of $92-94 billion, to a high-estimate of $113 billion. (A major unknown is the cost of tunneling, which will not be known until exploratory field studies are done.)

There are other concerns about the project as well, as noted by the Peer Review Group. Property acquisition in the Central Valley is taking far longer than anticipated (and is still not completed), and there have been a number of lawsuits slowing the project. The Authority did not have the requisite management experience (although that has improved significantly), and for a variety of reasons time and money have been wasted. Legislative oversight has also been weak. Recently inflation has also become a major concern due to the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the War in Ukraine (2022), and the effects these will have on the project are unclear at this point in time.

This project is still controversial. There is a significant subset of the population who are hostile to the project and believe it is a waste of public monies, although in a reputable poll taken in 2022 a majority of the population support it.[7]

Current Business Plan highlights

The 2022 BUSINESS PLAN also includes more current status information as well as information about current goals and activities:

Currently 119 miles (192 km) of right-of-way are under construction in the Central Valley. An additional 52 miles (84 km) are necessary to extend the system to Merced and Bakersfield to make an effective HSR system segment. Due to current financial (and other) constraints, the Authority will focus on five actions:

  1. Adding the additional 52 miles to the right-of-way (33 miles (53 km) north to Merced, and 17 miles (27 km) south to Bakersfield) and creating a 171-mile (275 km) HSR-operable segment between Merced and Bakersfield, linking three high growth areas in the Central Valley. Advanced design contracts have been awarded for both extensions, and work on route acquisition and construction will be performed as funding is available. The Merced station (at the north end) will provide a transfer point to the Altamont Corridor Express (ACE) and San Joaquins (Amtrak) rail routes to Sacramento and the Bay Area (San Francisco and Oakland), and the Bakersfield station (at the south end) will have a transfer to Thruway Bus Service for travel to Southern California. Note that this Initial Operating Segment would be replacing existing Amtrak service (the San Joaquin), which is one of Amtrak's most heavily traveled routes but which is forced to share track with heavy freight traffic, so this would offer significant passenger traffic improvement.
  2. Procuring a Track and Systems contract for the initial 119 miles of right-of-way. Power availability along the route is inadequate in a few places, and so will need to be remedied. When the initial 119 miles are completed, and track and necessary signaling and power are installed, there will be a two-year period of testing HSR trainsets, trackage, and control systems while the construction proceeds on the north and south extensions.
  3. By the end of 2024, all the necessary route selection, preliminary planning, and environmental approvals will be completed for the entire 500-mile (800 km) Phase 1 system. Thus, it will be ready to be constructed when funding becomes available. As of October 2022, roughly 420 miles (680 km) have been approved.[8] In particular, the routes from San Francisco to Palmdale and from Burbank to Los Angeles have been approved. Palmdale to Burbank is expected to be approved in 2023, and Los Angeles to Anaheim in 2024.[9]
  4. Other "bookend" investments to advance HSR projects will continue: (a) in Northern California, electrification of Caltrain and grade separations (plus other related improvements) in the 51 miles (82 km) between San Francisco and San Jose, and (b) in Southern California, phase A of Link Union Station, which through-tracks LA Union Station, and other improvements such as the Rosecrans-Marquardt grade separation. These investments will provide immediate benefits in more efficient, more environmentally beneficial, and safer operation of higher speed trains in the San Francisco and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. These modifications will also make those transit systems ready for the inclusion of HSR trainsets when linked in the Phase 1 system, since the HSR trainsets will be sharing trackage and have integrated schedules with local transit.
  5. When ready, the initial operating HSR system (171 miles (275 km) long) will be opened to public use under a contracted Early Train Operator. The system would then be composed of four stations (Merced, Fresno, Kings/Tulare, and Bakersfield), use four trainsets on two tracks, and operate at a speed of 180 miles per hour (290 km/h). Additional trainsets and the Madera station will be added as resources and needs permit. The Authority says (as of November 2021) it plans to "Commence testing of the electrified high-speed system in 2025, certify trains by 2027, and put electrified high-speed trains in service by the end of the decade."[10]

As of October 2022, there are pending grant applications to the federal government for:

  1. Construction and land acquisition to advance the extension south to Bakersfield,
  2. Purchase of the 4 trainsets needed for the Initial Operating Segment operations,
  3. Design of the Merced and Bakersfield extensions,
  4. Construction of HSR stations, and
  5. Double-tracking the initial 119 miles.[11]

A major addition to the development and operation plan is a new emphasis on risk analysis and risk mitigation, with these integrated into the formal authorization process. Also, contingency reserves are being increased. Current revenue and expense projections indicate that getting the 171-mile (275 km) segment operable is feasible.

After completing the initial operating segment, the next priority is to connect it to Gilroy and San Jose (the southern terminus of the Caltrain system). This will allow HSR trainsets to run from San Francisco to Bakersfield.

In earlier plans, the full 500-mile (800 km) Phase 1 system between San Francisco and Anaheim was to be completed in 2033; however, this has been slowed by unanticipated issues. The Phase 2 extensions to Sacramento and San Diego are still in the preliminary planning stages.

The project will require legislative action in the next couple years, so the issues raised by the Peer Review Group and the project consultant (KPMG) will help the legislature select from the Board's proposed plans or other alternatives.

NOTE: Refer to the References section for links to specific biannual Project Update Reports and Business Plans, and refer to the Peer Review Group section for the latest independent review of the project status and prospects as well as its prior reports.

Construction status

Main article: History of California High-Speed Rail § Construction

The initial Phase 1 construction is divided into separate Construction Packages (CP). For detailed construction status, use the link above. Current construction summary is as follows:

CP1 comprises 32 miles (51 km) from Avenue 17 north of Madera to East American Avenue south of Fresno. The contract was signed in August 2013 with groundbreaking on January 6, 2015, in Fresno. Construction is well underway with a majority of the individual projects either complete or under construction. Construction is expected to continue into late 2023.[12]

CP2-3 comprises 65 miles (105 km) from East American Avenue south of Fresno to 1 mile (1.6 km) north of the Tulare / Kern County border. The contract was signed in June 2015 with the joint venture of Dragados USA/Flatiron Construction. Groundbreaking took place in August 2018. Construction of CP2-3 is expected to continue into late 2023.[12]

CP4 comprises 22 miles (35 km) adjoining the end of CP2-3 to the intersection of Poplar / Madera Avenue northwest of Shafter. The contract was signed the 29th of February in 2016, and is estimated to be 86.3% complete as of August 2022.[13] Construction is expected to be completed by the beginning of March 2023. Track and systems work is planned to begin along the CP4 segment once construction on CP4 is complete.

SUMMARY As of June 2022, construction has been completed or is underway on 67 of 93 structures, and on 87 miles (140 km) of guideway of the 119 miles (192 km) of the initial system.[14] For the Bakersfield and Merced extensions (52 additional miles (84 km)), advanced design work, right-of-way mapping, and identification of utility relocation work is underway.

NOTE: The 2023 Project Update Report is due to be presented to the Legislature before March 1, 2023. This document will summarize all construction status. See BIANNUAL PROJECT UPDATE REPORTS.

Route and stations

Main article: Route of California High-Speed Rail

Refer to the Route link (above) for ROUTE and STATION information.

Communities affected

During Phase 1, the project displaced or adversely impacted Mexican, Cambodian and Japanese immigrants, homeless outreach organizations, homeless shelters, firefighters, nonprofits working with welfare recipients, thrift stores, and disadvantaged communities such as Wasco.[15][16]

History

Main article: History of California High-Speed Rail

Legislative

In 1996, the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) was established to begin formal planning in preparation for a ballot measure in 1998 or 2000.[17][18] The CHSRA, a state agency run by a board of governors, is required by law to operate without a subsidy, and to connect the state's major cities in the Bay Area, Central Valley, and Los Angeles Basin. Phase 2 (which has no timetable yet) would extend the system northward through the Central Valley to the Sacramento Valley Station in Sacramento and southward through the Inland Empire to the San Diego International Airport in San Diego.

In 2008, California voters approved the issuance of $9 billion in bonds for high speed rail in Proposition 1A,[19] a measure to construct the initial segment of the network. Proposition 1A and other legislation set certain performance standards for the project:[20]

  • Minimum 200 miles per hour (320 km/h) where conditions permit
  • Maximum travel time between SF and LA not to exceed 2 hr 40 min
  • Financially self-sustaining (operation and maintenance costs fully covered by revenue)

On January 28, 2010, the White House announced that California would receive $2.25 billion for California High Speed Rail.[21] Over the course of 2010 and 2011, the federal government awarded the Authority a further $4 billion in high-speed rail funding.[22][23][24]

In June 2014, state legislators and Governor Jerry Brown agreed to apportion the state's annual cap and trade funds so that 25% goes to high speed rail.[25] The state's Legislative Analyst's Office estimated that cap-and-trade income in 2015 and 2016 could total $3.7 billion, of which $925 million would be allocated to HSR.[26] The LAO's predictions were proven incorrect in its own revised report dated May 26, 2016, "State auction revenue will be about $1.8 billion in 2015–16" due to a weak May 2016 auction.[27]

On September 30, 2015, the Authority posted the names of 30 large firms who were interested in financing, constructing, and operating the California HSR system.[28]

Legal

In 2014, the CHSRA was challenged on its compliance with its statutory obligations under Proposition 1A (John Tos, Aaron Fukuda, and the Kings County Board of Supervisors v. California High-Speed Rail Authority). The case was split into two parts. The ruling in the first was that the requirements for the financing plan, environmental clearances, and construction plans did not need to be secured for the entire project before construction began, but only for each construction segment. The second part considered three Proposition 1A legal requirements: (1) Can the train travel from Los Angeles (Union Station) to San Francisco (Transbay Terminal) in two hours and 40 minutes? (2) Will the train require an operational subsidy? (3) Does the new "blended system" approach meet the definition of high-speed rail in Proposition 1A? Judge Kenny ruled on March 8, 2016, that although serious issues were raised, they are not "ripe for review" and that (because this is "an ongoing, dynamic, changing project") he noted "the authority may be able to accomplish these objectives at some point in the future." This did not preclude the possibility of future legal action against the Authority on these issues.[29]

On December 15, 2014, the federal Surface Transportation Board determined (using well-understood preemption rules) that its approval of the HSR project in August "categorically preexempts" lawsuits filed under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). This determination is still being tested in the California courts in a similar case, Friends of Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority.[30][needs update]

The case John Tos, et al. v. California High-Speed Rail Authority objected to funding plans approved by the Authority's board of directors for the San Francisco to San José corridor electrification project and the Central Valley construction segment. It alleges the actions were unconstitutional, relying on AB 1889 (dated 2016), which was an unconstitutional law because it was not approved by the voters, per Proposition 1A. In November 2018, the Superior Court ruled in the Authority's favor. More recently, an appeal was filed May 2019 in the Third District Court of Appeal. As of the 2020 Revised Business Plan, a decision is still pending.

Project budget concerns

Note: This subsection has a lot of old information, and will need some cleanup.

The project's cost and scope have long been a source of controversy. Election year proponents promised a $50 one-way Los Angeles to San Francisco fare.[31] In 2012, the Authority re-estimated the project's year-of-expenditure cost at $68.4 billion.[32] In 2015, the estimated cost of a fare from LA to San Francisco had risen to $86.[31] In March 2022, the Authority revised its estimate to $93.5 billion, pushing initial service to 2029 and services from Los Angeles to San Francisco to 2033.[33][34]

The Reason Foundation's Due Diligence Report (2008) projected that the final cost for the complete system (including both Phases I, II and an additional East Bay phase) would be $65.2 to $81.4 billion (2008). Current estimates from the Authority estimate a total cost for Phase 1 of $93 billion.[35] The Authority has been using Design-Build construction contracts to counter the tendency toward cost over-runs. All of the construction is to be done via "design-build" proposals wherein each builder is given leeway in the design and management of construction, but not the ability to run back with contract change orders except for extraordinary problems. The builder is given specifications but also given the freedom to meet them in their own way, plus the ability to modify the construction plans in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.[36] This however has been changed in 2022, as new contracts now are following the Design-Bid-Build format.

The California Legislative Analyst's Office published recommendations on May 10, 2011, which they said will help the high-speed rail project be developed successfully. They recommended that the California legislature seek flexibility on use of federal funds and then reconsider where construction of the high-speed rail line should start. They also recommended that the California legislature shift responsibility away from the Authority and fund only the administrative tasks of the Authority in the 2011–12 budget.[37]

In January 2012, an independent peer review panel published a report recommending the Legislature not approve issuing $2.7 billion in bonds to fund the project.[38] The panel of experts was created by state law to help safeguard the public's interest. The report said that moving ahead on the high-speed rail project without credible sources of adequate funding represents a financial risk to California.

Prior to the July 2012 vote, State Senator Joe Simitian (D-Palo Alto) expressed concerns about financing needed to complete the project, asking: "Is there additional commitment of federal funds? There is not. Is there additional commitment of private funding? There is not. Is there a dedicated funding source that we can look to in the coming years? There is not."[39] The lobbying and advocacy group Train Riders Association of California also considered that Bill SB 1029 "provides no high-speed service for the next decade".[40]

In July 2014, The World Bank reported that the per kilometer cost of California's high-speed rail system was $56 million, more than double the average cost of $17–21 million per km of high speed rail in China and more than the $25–39 million per km average for similar projects in Europe at the time.[41] High real estate prices in California and three large mountain ranges to cross contribute to the difference. For example, Construction Package 2–3 in the farmland of the flat Central Valley works out to $11.4 million per km, although this figure does not include electrification or property values, so it is roughly comparable internationally. Furthermore, the proposed High Speed 2 in Great Britain is estimated to be more expensive on a per mile basis than the Californian system.

As of May 2015, both construction packages awarded have come in significantly under staff estimates. For example, Construction Package 1 came in 20% under staff estimates ($985 million versus $1.2 billion),[42] and Construction Package 2-3 came in under by 17% to 28% ($1.365 billion[citation needed] versus $1.5–2 billion).

In December 2016, an internal-use-only draft risk assessment produced by the Federal Railroad Administration was delivered to the California Rail Authority which warned that the ICS (Merced-Bakersfield) segment could cost as much as $9.5 billion instead of the $6.4 billion originally budgeted, if certain challenges weren't addressed, including delays in environmental planning, lags in processing invoices and failures to acquire needed property. Federal Railroad Administration spokesman Matthew Lehner said that the draft risk assessment "is a standard oversight tool used on major capital projects – not just California", and he is confident the state can meet its deadline with continued focus and hard work.[43] Concern over the article prompted the Authority to send a letter on January 13, 2017, to the Legislature that said that the characterization of cost overruns, delays, and potential lapses of funds are not borne out by the facts, and that other key federal findings were ignored.[44] After downplaying risks of cost overruns, in January 2018 under a new CEO, the Authority acknowledged that cost estimates for the initial segment had increased to $10.6 billion.[45][46]

In 2018, it was estimated that the first phase of CHSR will cost $77 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars, assuming a 2033 completion year and 3% inflation.[47]

Construction milestones

2010 On December 2, 2010, the Authority Board of Directors voted to begin construction on the first section of the system from Madera to Fresno.

2012 In July 2012, the California legislature and Gov. Jerry Brown approved construction of the high-speed system.[48][49]

2015 Fresno hosted a groundbreaking ceremony on January 6, 2015, to mark the commencement of sustained construction activities.[50]


Speed requirements

According to Proposition 1A, the train must be fully electric and capable of a sustained operating speed of no less than 200 miles per hour (320 km/h).[51] There are also a number of travel time benchmarks. The important benchmarks applicable to Phase 1 of the project are: (1) a maximum nonstop travel time between San Francisco and San Jose of 30 minutes, and (2) a maximum nonstop travel time between San Jose and Los Angeles of 2 hours and 10 minutes. (Thus, a nonstop time from San Francisco to Los Angeles in 2 hours and 40 minutes.) In addition, the achievable operating headway between successive trains must be less than 5 minutes.[51]

Maximum nonstop travel times for each corridor must not exceed the following times, according to Proposition 1A:[51]

  1. San Francisco–Los Angeles Union Station: 2 hours, 40 minutes
  2. San Francisco–San Jose: 30 minutes
  3. San Jose–Los Angeles: 2 hours, 10 minutes
  4. San Diego–Los Angeles: 1 hour, 20 minutes
  5. Inland Empire–Los Angeles: 30 minutes
  6. Sacramento–Los Angeles: 2 hours, 20 minutes

The Authority's plan is still within the requirement, and meets the current global standard for HSR speeds.

  • San Francisco to San Jose nonstop over the blended-system trackage at 102 miles per hour (164 km/h) for (51 miles (82 km)) = 30 min. (note 30 min. is the maximum allowed).
  • San Jose to Los Angeles nonstop at 220 miles per hour (350 km/h) for (417 miles (671 km) or 437 miles (703 km)) = 1 hr. 54 min. or 1 hr. 59 min. (note 2 hr. 10 min. is the maximum allowed). Even at a slower 200 miles per hour (320 km/h) the times would be 2 hrs. 5 min. or 2 hrs. 11 min. (Note: since the final SF–LA route has not been adopted, the route length will be between the two numbers given.)

Chinese High Speed Rail has been operated at speeds in excess of 217 miles per hour (349 km/h) since October 2017, after several years of running at only 200 miles per hour (320 km/h). A Siemens Velaro trainset without any modifications has posted a speed record well in excess of 400 kilometres per hour (250 mph), though economic considerations keep them limited to 320 kilometres per hour (200 mph) in revenue service. The French Alstom TGV Duplex is also able to sustain speeds of 360 kilometres per hour (220 mph), as have shown several days of testing in 2008,[52] not to mention all new TGV speed lines designed for 320 km/h are tested at the speed of 352 km/h (commercial speed + 10%) by TGVs.[53][54]

The current trainset specification requires the capability of sustained speeds of 220 miles per hour (350 km/h).[51] So, ultimately it is up to the trainset manufacturers to meet the Authority's speed requirement, since the proposed route and speed do meet the Proposition 1A requirements.

Rolling stock

Artist's rendering of a TGV-Type California High-Speed Rail trainset with livery; this type of train is used in all CHSRA materials, but since the exact model of trainset to be acquired is not known, this is only illustrative.

Acquisition

In January 2015, the California High Speed Rail Authority issued a request for proposal (RFP) for complete trainsets. The proposals received will be reviewed so that acceptable bidders can be selected, and then requests for bids will be sent out.

Per the 2020 Business Plan, in the limited initial operational system (171 miles (275 km), from Merced to Bakersfield) only four trainsets will be required.

It is estimated that for the entire Phase 1 system up to 95 trainsets might be required.[55] Initially only 16 trainsets are anticipated to be purchased.[56] Trainset expenses, according to the 2014 Business Plan, are planned at $889 million for the IOS (Initial Operating Segment) in 2022, $984 million for the Bay to Basin in 2027, and $1.4 billion for the completed Phase 1 in 2029, for a total of $3.276 billion.[57]

In February 2015, ten companies formally expressed interest in producing trainsets for the system: Alstom, AnsaldoBreda (now Hitachi Rail Italy), Bombardier Transportation, CSR, Hyundai Rotem, Kawasaki Rail Car, Siemens, Sun Group U.S.A. partnered with CNR Tangshan, and Talgo. CSR merged with CNR in June 2015 to form CRRC Corporation, bringing the number of companies down to eight.[58] Bombardier Transportation completed its merge with Alstom by January 2021.[59]

Due to all of the company acquisitions and mergers, the number of companies now qualified for the tender is seven. The qualified companies are Alstom, Siemens Mobility, Talgo, Hitachi Rail Italy, CRRC, Hyundai Rotem, and Kawasaki Rail Car.

Included in a grant request to the Biden administration is a request for funds to purchase trainsets.

Specifications

In addition to many other requirements:[60]

  • each trainset will have a sustained continuous speed of 220 mph (350 km/h);
  • a maximum testing speed of 242 mph (389 km/h);
  • a lifespan of at least 30 years;
  • a length no longer than about 680 feet (210 m);
  • the ability to operate two trainsets as a single "consist" (a long train);
  • have control cabs at both ends of each trainset and the ability to go equally well in either direction;
  • pass-by noise levels (82 feet (25 m) from track) not to exceed 88 dB at 155 mph (249 km/h) and 96 dB at 220 mph (350 km/h);
  • have at least 450 seats and carry 8 bicycles;
  • have seating for first class and business class passengers as well as space for wheelchairs;
  • have food service similar to airplane-style serving;
  • allow for use of cellphones, broadband wireless internet access, and onboard entertainment services;
  • have a train communications network to notify passengers of travel/train/station/time information;
  • and have earthquake safety systems for safe stopping and exiting.

One specification causing difficulty is the HSR train requirement for a floor height of 50 in (130 cm) above the rails. This is too high for Caltrain trains, which have a floor height of only 25 in (64 cm) (Metrolink trains have a similar issue). In October 2014, Caltrain and the Authority agreed to work together to try to implement "level-boarding" on the shared station platforms.[61] The Authority resisted lowering their trainset floor height,[62] but a solution was found with Caltrain's new Stadler KISS EMUs which will feature doors at two heights, with the higher doors compatible with the CAHSR platforms.[3] This solution works for Caltrain because only 4 of the stations it uses would be shared with the CAHSR trains, and the rest would use the lower doors.

An additional factor for the selection of a model is the Buy America regulation. The Federal Railroad Administration has granted a waiver for just two prototypes to be manufactured off-shore before the remaining trainsets (initially 15 to 20 trains) would need to be built according to the rules.[63] These were mentioned as a significant reason that Chinese manufacturers dropped out of the Brightline West (then known as XpressWest) project with similar technical trainset specifications.[64]

HSR passenger line operations

REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATIONS. In April 2017, the CHSRA announced it had received five responses to its request for qualifications for the contract to assist with the development and management of the initial phase of the high speed line and be the initial operator.[65][66]

SELECTED OPERATOR. In October 2017, the California High Speed Rail Authority announced that the DB International US consortium had been chosen as the Early Train Operator for initial operations.[67] This decision came after a Request for Qualifications was put out by the Authority looking for well established groups able to provide operational guidance for the future system once opened.

Economic projections

In addition to the direct reduction in travel times the HSR project will produce, there are other anticipated benefits, both general to the state, to the regions the train will pass through, and to the areas immediately around the train stations.

Statewide economic growth and job creation                              

The 2022 Business Plan estimates that as of June 2021, the statewide economic benefits of the project included 64,400–70,500 job-years of employment, $4.8–$5.2 billion in labor employment, and $12.7–13.7 billion in economic output. The business plan also notes that as of February 2022, 699 small businesses statewide have been involved in the project. "The Economic Impact of California High-Speed Rail" (a 2022 factsheet) is available from the Authority.

Older economic studies are also available. In 2009, the Authority projected that construction of the system will create 450,000 permanent jobs through the new commuters that will use the system,[68] and that the Los Angeles–San Francisco route would be able generate a net operating revenue of $2.23 billion by 2023,[68] consistent with the experience of other high-speed intercity operations around the world.[69][70] The 2012 Economic Impact Analysis Report by Parsons Brinkerhoff (project managers for the Authority) also indicated substantial economic benefits from high-speed rail.[71]

Environmental benefits

According to a 2022 Carbon Footprint Calculator on the Authority website,[72] the environmental benefits of the system include CO2e/GHG emissions savings per passenger round-trip of:

  • 142 pounds on the Merced-Bakersfield Initial Operating Segment
  • 349 pounds for San Francisco-Los Angeles
  • 303 pounds for San Jose-Burbank
  • 389 pounds for San Francisco-Anaheim
  • 337 pounds for San Francisco-Burbank

The Authority estimates that by 2040, the system could carry 50 million riders per year, and that at full operation, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will be equivalent to removing 400,000 vehicles off the road.[73]

Regional benefits

In its 67-page ruling in May 2015, the federal Surface Transportation Board noted: "The current transportation system in the San Joaquin Valley region has not kept pace with the increase in population, economic activity, and tourism. ... The interstate highway system, commercial airports, and conventional passenger rail systems serving the intercity market are operating at or near capacity and would require large public investments for maintenance and expansion to meet existing demand and future growth over the next 25 years or beyond."[74] Thus, the Board sees the HSR system as providing valuable benefits to the region's transportation needs.

The San Joaquin Valley is also one of the poorest areas of the state. For example, the unemployment rate near the end of 2014 in Fresno County was 2.2% higher than the statewide average.[75] And, of the five poorest metro areas in the country, three are in the Central Valley.[76] The HSR system has the potential to significantly improve this region and its economy. A large January 2015 report to the CHSRA examined this issue.[77]

In addition to jobs and income levels in general, the presence of HSR is expected to benefit the growth in the cities around the HSR stations. It is anticipated that this will help increase population density in those cities and reduce "development sprawl" out into surrounding farmlands.[78]

Ridership and revenue concerns

In May 2015, the Los Angeles Times published an article by critics on the estimated operational revenue of the system in "Doing the math on California's bullet train fares".[79] The article raised a number of doubts that the system could be self-supporting, as required by Prop 1A, and ended by quoting Louis Thompson (chairman of an unnamed state-created review panel) who said "We will not know until late in the game how everything will turn out."[80]

The Due Diligence Report (2008) projected fewer riders by 2030 than officially estimated: 23.4 to 31.1 million intercity riders a year instead of the 65.5 to 96.5 million forecast by the Authority and later confirmed by an independent peer review.[81]

The Authority's initial ridership estimates were unrealistically high,[citation needed] and have been revised several times using progressively better estimating models, including risk analysis and confidence levels. The 2014 study (at a 50% confidence level) estimated the following ridership/revenue figures:

  • 2022 (IOS): 11.3 million riders / $625 million
  • 2027 (Bay to Basin): 19.1 million riders / $1055.6 million
  • 2029 (Phase 1 initial): 28.4 million riders / $1350.4 million
  • 2040 (Phase 1 mature): 33.1 million riders / $1559.4 million[82]

Peer review, public opinion, and criticism

There are two types of review and criticism noted here: the legally established "peer review" process that the California legislature established for an independent check on the Authority's planning and implementation efforts,[83] and public criticisms by groups, individuals, public agencies, and elected officials.

As of the February 2015 conference Bold Bets: California on the Move?, which is hosted by The Atlantic magazine and Siemens, Dan Richard, the chair of the Authority, warned that not all issues to get the HSR system in place had been resolved at that time.[84] This is still true as of 2022.

Peer Review Group

The California Legislature established the California High-Speed Rail Peer Review Group to provide independent analysis of the Authority's planning and implementation efforts. Their documents are submitted to the Legislature as needed.

The most recent report was submitted April 1, 2022. [2].

This report noted a number of positive factors:

  • Improved prospects for federal funding with the Biden Administration.
  • Disruptions and impacts caused by COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and inflation are all noted but being dealt with.
  • Significant progress has been made on the necessary environmental clearances.
  • Greater attention is being given to local transit connectivity and local economic impacts.
  • Major improvements have been made to project management and risk mitigation.

However, there were also a number of significant concerns noted:

  • The total level of uncertainty has likely increased due to effects of COVID-19 and inflation.
  • Prior experience with cost increases and scheduling delays raises some uncertainties about future performance. Cost increases have been over 86%, average delays have been 118%, only 90% of ordinary real estate parcel needed have been acquired, only 63% of railroad parcels have been acquired, and only 65% of utility parcels have been acquired.
  • Some of the cost estimates presented were out of date, but expected to be updated in the 2023 Project Update Report.
  • Major components of the project (representing over half its cost) have no bidding or contract management experience. Thus, estimates for these are clearly suspect.
  • There are critical issues regarding management and legal issues with other agencies for the operation of the system which remain unresolved. (There are a number of these listed, as well as unknown long term impacts of COVID-19 on ridership and inflation.)
  • Adequate legislative oversight is lacking.
  • Per the report, "[O]verall project funding remains inadequate and unstable making effective management extremely difficult. In addition, the Authority has no clear guidance from the Legislature on the next steps in the project."
  • "Even with a realistic share of new Federal funding, the project cannot get outside the Central Valley without added state or local funding from sources not yet identified."

Professional studies

Two papers have been made of station siting and design in Europe.

Eric Eidlin, an employee of the Federal Transit Administration (Region 9, San Francisco), wrote a study in 2015 funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States comparing the structural differences of the three relative to HSR and their historical development.[85] He also focused on the issue of station siting, design, use, and impact on the surrounding community. From this, he developed ten recommendations for CAHSRA. Among these are:

  • Develop bold, long-term visions for the HSR corridors and stations.
  • Where possible, site HSR stations in central city locations.
  • In rural areas, emphasize train speed; in urban areas, emphasize transit connectivity.
  • Plan for and encourage the non-transit roles of the HSR stations.

Eidlin's study also notes that in California there has been debate on the disadvantages of the proposed blended service in the urban areas of San Francisco and Los Angeles, including reduced speeds, more operating restraints, and complicated track-sharing agreements. There are some inherent advantages in blended systems that have not received much attention: shorter transfer distances for passengers, and reduced impacts on the neighborhoods. Blended systems are in use in Europe.[86]

A 202-page study by A. Loukaitou-Sideris, D. Peters, and W. Wei of the Mineta Transportation Institute at San Jose State University in 2015 compared examples of "blended systems" in Spain and Germany where conventional and high-speed rail (HSR) services either used the same tracks over a portion of track or at a specific station.[87] The study found that blended systems were cheaper to build, required less space, and provided easy transfers between different modes of transportation but resulted in lower system capacity (due to greater separation distances required when combining HSR and conventional traffic), were often not possible to properly implement in urban areas due to the additional land area requirements for passing sidings and resulted in additional challenges operations and caused frequent delays.[88]

Think tank studies

NOTE: The studies listed below date from 2008 & 2013; there are no updates or new reports listed below.

Right-wing think tanks such as the Reason Foundation,[89] the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, and Citizens Against Government Waste published a study which they named the "Due Diligence Report" (2008) critiquing the project.[90] In 2013, the Reason Foundation published an "Updated Due Diligence Report" (2013).[91] Key elements of the updated critique include:

  • operating train speed higher than any existing HSR system at the time
  • unrealistic ridership projections
  • increasing costs
  • no clear funding plan
  • incorrect assumptions regarding HSR alternatives
  • increasing fare projections

This 2013 critique was based on the 2012 Business Plan. Although the 2012 Business Plan has been superseded by the 2022 Business Plan, the critique does include the Blended System approach using commuter tracks in SF and LA.

James Fallows in The Atlantic magazine summarized all the public criticisms thus, "It will cost too much, take too long, use up too much land, go to the wrong places, and in the end won't be fast or convenient enough to do that much good anyway."[80]

Public opinion surveys

2022

A survey of registered voters by UC Berkeley's Institute of Government Studies released in April 2022[92] says:

"Majority supports continuing to build the state’s high speed rail project even with its scaled back service offerings. By a five to three margin (56% to 35%) voters support the state continuing to build the high-speed rail project even if, as is currently planned, its operations only extend from Bakersfield to Merced in the Central Valley by the year 2030 and to the Bay Area by the year 2033."

"Views about continuing to build the high-speed rail project are highly partisan, with nearly three in four Democrats (73%) backing the project compared to just 25% support among the state’s Republicans."

2016

The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) March 2016 Statewide Survey indicated that 52% of Californians support the project, while 63% of Californians think the project is either "very important" or "somewhat important" for California's economy and quality of life. Support varies by location (with the San Francisco Bay Area the highest at 63%, and lowest in Orange/San Diego at 47%), by race (Asians 66%, Latinos 58%, Whites 44%, and Blacks 42%), by age (declining sharply with increasing age), and by political orientation (Democrats 59%, independents 47%, and Republicans 29%).[93]

Dan Richard, chair of the Authority, said in an interview with James Fallows that he believes approval levels will increase when people can start seeing progress, and trains start running on the tracks.[84]

Published public criticism

The New York Times (2022)

In a New York Times article "How California’s Bullet Train Went Off the Rails" published October 9, 2022, Ralph Vartabedian, a frequent critic of the plan, wrote how the project is a political nightmare. One critic he cites is Dan McNamara, a career project manager for SNCF, the French national railroad, who said that Morocco (where SNCF subsequently assisted in building an HSR system) was "less politically dysfunctional" than California.[94] SNCF attempted to become involved in the project in the early 2000s, but withdrew in 2011. This article devoted extensive text to the route chosen as being a political compromise to garner more potential riders, but with the certainty of a longer, more expensive, and more difficult to complete project. The project has subsequently been stumbling in planning, management, budgeting, and its timeline projections.

Issues with this article:

(1) Note this article does not purport to be an up-to-date or complete review of the project. For that, refer to the latest Peer Review Group report (see the Peer Review Group section above).

(2) By 2008, Proposition 1A had passed, and the route had become established in law. The route criticism is thus largely ‘old news’, since the voters of California specifically approved a route that linked all the major population centers of the state together. This was a political decision, and not an engineering one. So, SNCF's recommendation for an easier, more direct, and less expensive route between San Francisco and Los Angeles became moot.

(3) California's Department of Transportation has a State Rail Plan that integrates HSR with local transit systems. With an eye to "blended system" operation, the Authority has been helping fund improvements to the metropolitan commuter rail systems in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The "blended" HSR trains will share trackage and train control, and run at about the same speed as the improved local commuter rail; the article does not mention this. Thus, technically the HSR route actually is being built in the metropolitan areas now, and safer and higher speed local transit will be a result. In the Central Valley, the HSR trains will run at their higher speed, about twice that of the commuter rail line speed. (In the north, HSR funding is assisting with trackage, control, and electrification; in the south it is assisting with trackage.)

(4) The article correctly states that the HSR system is a massive and complex undertaking, and that numerous mistakes have been made. However, there was no agency in the US with the right experience to implement it. Thus, the Authority has had to learn the hard way what to do and how to do it. The Authority is getting more competent as the project progresses and the myriad problems are being resolved one by one. (Management improvements are discussed in the HSR Business Plan and the Peer Review Group reports.) So, in fact, the project actually is progressing; the article left the impression that it was foundering.

(5) The Authority indicates that projected funding will be sufficient to get the Initial Operating Segment (IOS) into operation and linked to other transit systems to the north and south; this is not noted in the article. Also not noted is that passenger rail in the Central Valley is currently limited by freight traffic, is one of the highest volume Amtrak routes in the country, and is in need of an upgrade. By 2024 all the necessary route plans and environmental approvals for Phase 1 will be completed, so that only funding will be needed to begin the construction process on other segments. However, the Peer Review Group notes that additional funding sources will be required to build the next segment, which links the IOS to San Jose. (San Jose is the south terminus of the Bay Area’s blended Caltrain route, and connecting it to the IOS would enable HSR trains to run from San Francisco to Bakersfield). Building the link to the Southern California segment is even more problematic at this point. So, while it is clear that the entire system cannot be built as envisioned with known resources, a significant part appears likely to be successfully implemented and serve a real need.

The Washington Post (2022)

The Washington Post published a related article on Oct. 12, 2022 titled "California’s ‘crazy train’ is still going nowhere fast" by Charles Lane, another opinion writer who has previously criticized the project. In this article he cites the New York Times article, and repeats many of the points made there. He says, "Surely there is a cheaper, less grandiose way to achieve the same [gasoline] savings." He concludes by advocating abandoning the project.

All of the issues with the New York Times article also apply to this one, with the addition of the following one:

(6) His suggestion that other ways be found to achieve the same fuel savings does make sense on one level. For instance, that same amount of money could be used to replace internal combustion engine automobiles, and achieve even more gasoline usage reductions. However, reducing gasoline use does not address the problem of providing long distance transit in the state. Apparently no one has a come up with a more cost-efficient solution at this point. (See the Alternative infrastructure proposals section for the ones publicly discussed.) So, Mr. Lane may certainly wish for a better solution than HSR, however, there doesn't appear to be one available now.

Related projects

Brightline West connection to Las Vegas

Brightline West (formerly Desert Xpress and XpressWest) is a project that since 2007 has been planning to build a high-speed rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada, part of the "Southwest Rail Network" they hope to create. The rail line would begin in Las Vegas and cross the Mojave Desert stopping 5 miles (8.0 km) outside of Victorville, California and eventually terminating in Palmdale, California (where it would connect with CAHSR and Metrolink). This route would total about 230 miles (370 km). Lisa Marie Alley, speaking for CAHSRA, said that there have been ongoing discussions concerning allowing the trains to use CAHSRA lines to go further into the Los Angeles area, although no commitments have been made as yet. While many approvals have been obtained for the rail line from Victorville to Las Vegas, the section from Palmdale to Victorville has none as yet.[95] In September 2018, Florida-based railway company Brightline purchased the rights and assets to the connection.[96] As of May 2022, Brightline West has yet to begin construction after several years of delays and setbacks due to lack of investor interest as well as environmental and economic hurdles. The project is currently estimated to cost upwards of $8 billion.

Alternative infrastructure proposals

NOTE: The discussions here are moot, since the project is being constructed, and there are no viable alternatives at present.

Some have offered the idea that instead of risking the large expenditures of high-speed rail, existing transportation methods should be increased to meet transportation needs. In a report commissioned by the Authority, a comparison was made to the needed infrastructure improvements if high-speed rail were not constructed. According to the report, the cost of building equivalent capacity to the $68.4 billion (YOE) Phase 1 Blended plan, in airports and freeways, is estimated to be at minimum $119 billion (YOE) for 4,295 new lane-miles (6,912 km) of highway, plus $38.6 billion (YOE) for 115 new airport gates and 4 new runways, for a total estimated cost of $158 billion.[97]

As an intention to undermine legislative support for the high-speed rail project, Elon Musk proposed Hyperloop as a replacement for HSR. Musk had previously criticized the high-speed rail project as being too expensive and not technologically advanced enough. However, this is an unproven technology for its stated purpose, the entire route would be underground (and thus require massive tunneling), and it has major issues concerning how it could be implemented in a large scale public transit system format. However, it appears that a Hyperloop system might finally be constructed for freight use. See this online adaptation from the Horizon newsletter (April 28, 2022): 9 Years Later, Elon Musk's Biggest Pipe Dream May Finally Come True.

Further reading

  • CHSRA's 2022 Business Plan describes the latest project goals, financing, and development plans. (SB 1029 (enacted in 2012) requires the Authority to produce a revised business plan every two years.[49])
  • James Fallows in The Atlantic magazine wrote a series of 17 articles (from July 2014 to January 2015) about the HSR system which covers many aspects of the system, criticisms of it, and responses to those criticisms.
  • The "Bold Bets: California on the Move?" conference was hosted February 2015 by The Atlantic magazine and Siemens. There were some significant discussions, presentations, and interviews. Dan Richard, chair of the Authority, was interviewed by James Fallows.[84]

Footnotes

  1. ^ California High-Speed Rail Authority. "Implementation Plan" (PDF). pp. 23, 25. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 10, 2008. Retrieved July 17, 2008.
  2. ^ "TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM: Traction Power 2x25kV Autotransformer Feed Type Electrification System & System Voltages" (PDF). HSR.CA.gov. CHSRA. Retrieved November 3, 2016.
  3. ^ a b "KISS Double-Decker Electric Multiple Unit EMU for Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (CALTRAIN), California, USA" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on October 6, 2016. Retrieved October 16, 2016.
  4. ^ "HSR Q+A: Blended System & Passing Tracks with Boris Lipkin". California High-Speed Rail Authority. 2020. Archived from the original on December 12, 2021. Retrieved October 12, 2020.
  5. ^ "ES.0 Executive Summary: ES.1 Supplemental Alternatives Analysis Report Results" (PDF). Hsr.ca.gov. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
  6. ^ https://hsr.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2022-Business-Plan-FINAL-A11Y.pdf[bare URL PDF]
  7. ^ https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7sn293xs
  8. ^ "NEWS RELEASE: High-Speed Rail Board Completes Environmental Clearance in Northern California". California High Speed Rail. August 18, 2022. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  9. ^ CAHSRA. "Revised Draft Business Plan 2022" (PDF). p. 43.
  10. ^ "Statewide".
  11. ^ https://hsr.ca.gov/2022/10/11/news-release-california-high-speed-rail-applies-for-millions-in-new-federal-funds-to-advance-construction-toward-bakersfield/
  12. ^ a b CHSRA. "2020 Business Plan" (PDF). p. ii.
  13. ^ CAHSRA. "Central Valley Status Report, October 2022" (PDF).
  14. ^ CAHSRA. "Central Valley Status Report, August 2022" (PDF).
  15. ^ RALPH VARTABEDIAN (October 29, 2021). "Bullet train leaves a trail of grief among the disadvantaged of the San Joaquin Valley". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved November 11, 2021. up and down the San Joaquin Valley, the bullet train is hitting hard at people who are already struggling to survive tough economic conditions in one of the poorest regions in the nation
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  95. ^ Makien, Julie (September 17, 2015). "A high-speed rail from L.A. to Las Vegas? China says it's partnering with U.S. to build". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on October 6, 2012. Retrieved September 19, 2015.
  96. ^ "Brightline to Build Express Intercity Passenger Rail Connecting Southern California and Las Vegas". Press.gobrightline.com. Archived from the original on September 18, 2018. Retrieved October 4, 2018.
  97. ^ "Comparison of Providing the Equivalent Capacity to High-Speed Rail through Other Modes" (PDF). April 2012. Retrieved October 31, 2013. After adjusting the analysis to be more comparable to the costs described in the Business Plan, the total costs of equivalent investment in airports and highways would be $123–138 billion (in 2011 dollars) to build 4,295–4,652 lane-miles of highways, 115 gates, and four runways for Phase 1 Blended and Phase 1 Full Build, respectively... In year-of-expenditure (YOE) dollars, the highway and airport costs would be $158–186 billion.

References

BIANNUAL PROJECT UPDATE REPORTS

The 2023 Project Update Report is due to be presented to the Legislature before March 1, 2023. Update Reports are available for the years 2015, 2017, and 2019 through the above link. Specific items required in the report include:

  • Summary of overall progress.
  • Current and projected budget by segment.
  • Comparison of the current schedule and budget to the 2012 Business Plan.
  • Summary of the last two years (milestones and issues), expectations in the next two years.
  • A thorough discussion of risks and steps taken to mitigate them.
  • In addition, in June 2022 additional requirements were added specifically for project progress and expectations for the Merced to Bakersfield segment.

BIANNUAL BUSINESS PLANS

The California High Speed Rail Authority is continually reevaluating how to bring the project authorized by voters into existence, and revising its plans accordingly. Every two years the Authority must present a Business Plan to the legislature. Business Plans are available through the above link for the years 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to California High-Speed Rail.
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