Trumpism
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Trumpism is a term that refers to the collection of policies, political ideologies, and rhetorical styles associated with former President Donald Trump. It encompasses not only the specific policies and ideas he championed during his presidency but also the distinctive language and rhetoric he frequently employed.[1][2] "Trumpism" is also used pejoratively by Trump's political opponents, most of whom on the left oppose capitalism in favor of socialism.[3] The far left, as well as the new Woke, support a radical socialist agenda or progressivism, all of which lead to communism and the inevitable loss of freedoms.[4] Political opposition on the left distorts or exaggerates the political ideologies and governing style of the right, including those associated with Donald Trump and his supporters, as well as the emotional and social aspects of the movement. Marxists have linked Trumpism with fascism and neo-fascism.[5] However, doing so draws a false parallel because Trumpism blends contemporary and traditional political currents in a manner that renders it distinctly American, and characteristic of the 21st century, which differs greatly from the European Fascism of the past century.[6]
The pejorative use of the label Trumpism has been used by anti-capitalists to label national-conservative and national-populist movements in other Western democracies. Many politicians in other countries have been labeled as staunch allies of Trump or Trumpism, or even as their country's equivalent to Trump, by various news agencies; among them are Silvio Berlusconi, Jair Bolsonaro, Horacio Cartes, Rodrigo Duterte, Pauline Hanson, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Nigel Farage, Hong Joon-Pyo, Boris Johnson, Jarosław Kaczyński, Bidzina Ivanishvili, Marine Le Pen, Narendra Modi, Benjamin Netanyahu, Viktor Orbán, Najib Razak, Matteo Salvini, and Geert Wilders.[7]
Populist themes, sentiments, and methods
Trumpism started its development predominantly during Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. For many scholars, it denotes a populist political method that suggests nationalistic answers to political, economic, and social problems. Left wing factions believe these inclinations are refracted into such policy preferences as immigration restrictionism, trade protectionism, isolationism, and opposition to entitlement reform.[8] As a political method, populism is not driven by any particular ideology.[9] Former National Security Advisor and close Trump advisor John Bolton states this is true of Trump, disputing that Trumpism even exists in any meaningful philosophical sense, adding that "[t]he man does not have a philosophy. And people can try and draw lines between the dots of his decisions. They will fail."[10] Trump employed provocative political language and derogatory rhetoric, which is not new to American politics. However, his use of mocking and insulting language throughout his 2016 presidential campaign was often characterized as unconventional and surprisingly lacking in political repercussions.[11]
Writing for the Routledge Handbook of Global Populism (2019), Olivier Jutel claims, "What Donald Trump reveals is that the various iterations of right-wing American populism have less to do with a programmatic social conservatism or libertarian economics than with enjoyment."[12] Referring to the populism of Trump, sociologist Michael Kimmel states that it "is not a theory [or] an ideology, it's an emotion. And the emotion is righteous indignation that the government is screwing 'us'".[13] Kimmel notes that "Trump is an interesting character because he channels all that sense of what I called 'aggrieved entitlement,'"[14] a term Kimmel defines as "that sense that those benefits to which you believed yourself entitled have been snatched away from you by unseen forces larger and more powerful. You feel yourself to be the heir to a great promise, the American Dream, which has turned into an impossible fantasy for the very people who were supposed to inherit it."[15]
Other contributors to the Routledge Handbook of Populism note that populist leaders rather than being ideology driven are instead pragmatic and opportunistic regarding themes, ideas and beliefs that strongly resonate with their followers.[16] Exit polling data suggests the campaign was successful at mobilizing the "white disenfranchised",[17] the lower- to working-class European-Americans who are experiencing growing social inequality and who often have stated opposition to the American political establishment. Ideologically, Trumpism has a right-wing populist accent.[18][19]
The new woke
Much of the pejorative use of Trumpism is rooted in the emergence of the new "woke". Their perspective, as opposed to the traditional universalism of the social-democratic European left, is marked by a skepticism of institutions and a rejection of state power, reminiscent of the radicalism seen in past movements such as the anti-Vietnam War protests and militant Black nationalism. This perspective advocates for direct wealth transfer mechanisms, like reparations, and challenges the systemic racism perceived in law enforcement and immigration policies. While it prompts debate within liberal circles, its historical ties to radical left movements highlight its departure from conventional liberal ideologies. The rise of "wokeness" reflects a resurgence of radicalism aimed at contesting liberal legitimacy and fostering solidarity among marginalized groups and their allies, reminiscent of past factional struggles between liberals and radical leftists.[20] The diverse perspectives on Trumpism, spanning from the far left and woke movement to conventional liberal ideologies, as well as the center and center-right viewpoints, are as notable as the blending of contemporary and traditional political currents emblematic of the 21st century. This distinctive fusion sets Trumpism apart from the European Fascism witnessed in the previous century.[6]
Focus on sentiments
Historian Peter E. Gordon raises the possibility that "Trump, far from being a violation of the norm, actually signifies an emergent norm of the social order" where the categories of the psychological and political have dissolved.[21][22]}} In accounting for Trump's election and ability to sustain stable high approval ratings among a significant segment of voters, Erika Tucker argues in the book Trump and Political Philosophy that though all presidential campaigns have strong emotions associated with them, Trump was able to recognize, and then to gain the trust and loyalty of those who, like him felt a particular set of strong emotions about perceived changes in the United States. She notes, "Political psychologist Drew Westen has argued that Democrats are less successful at gauging and responding to affective politics—issues that arouse strong emotional states in citizens."[23]
Trends in journalism
Communications scholar Michael Carpini states that "Trumpism is a culmination of trends that have been occurring for several decades. What we are witnessing is nothing short of a fundamental shift in the relationships between journalism, politics, and democracy." Among the shifts, Carpini identifies "the collapsing of the prior [media] regime's presumed and enforced distinctions between news and entertainment."[24] Examining Trump's use of media for the book Language in the Trump Era, communications professor Marco Jacquemet writes that "It's an approach that, like much of the rest of Trump's ideology and policy agenda, assumes (correctly, it appears) that his audiences care more about shock and entertainment value in their media consumption than almost anything else."[25] The perspective is shared among other communication academics, with Plasser & Ulram (2003) describing a media logic which emphasizes "personalization ... a political star system ... [and] sports based dramatization."[26] Olivier Jutel notes that "Donald Trump's celebrity status and reality-TV rhetoric of 'winning' and 'losing' corresponds perfectly to these values," asserting that "Fox News and conservative personalities from Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck and Alex Jones do not simply represent a new political and media voice but embody the convergence of politics and media in which affect and enjoyment are the central values of media production."[27]
Studying Trump's use of social media, anthropologist Jessica Johnson finds that social emotional pleasure plays a central role writing, "Rather than finding accurate news meaningful, Facebook users find the affective pleasure of connectivity addictive, whether or not the information they share is factual, and that is how communicative capitalism captivates subjects as it holds them captive."[28] Looking back at the world prior to social media, communications researcher Brian L. Ott writes: "I'm nostalgic for the world of television that [Neil] Postman (1985) argued, produced the 'least well-informed people in the Western world' by packaging news as entertainment. (pp. 106–107)[29] Twitter is producing the most self-involved people in history by treating everything one does or thinks as newsworthy. Television may have assaulted journalism, but Twitter killed it."[30] Commenting on Trump's support among Fox News viewers, Hofstra communications college dean Mark Lukasiewicz has a similar perspective writing, "Tristan Harris famously said that social networks are about 'affirmation, not information'—and the same can be said about cable news, especially in prime time."[31]
There are many opinions as to why certain aspects of Trumpism have attracted the general populace, such as Trump's criticism of mainstream media, and calling it "fake news" while pointing out certain journalists with CNN, MSNBC, and the Big Three networks. It cannot be said that Trump lacked good cause as evidenced by the discredited Steele dossier or Russiagate. The Columbia Journalism Review published a 4-part series dated January 30, 2023 titled The press versus the president by Jeff Gerth.[32] Editor in Chief Kyle Pope referred to the time frame of the series as journalism's "tortured dance with Donald Trump, the man who would be the country’s forty-fifth president—first dismissing him, then embracing him as a source of ratings and clicks, then going all in on efforts to catalogue Trump as a threat to the country (also a great source of ratings and clicks)."[33] The first two paragraphs in the Afterward of the series Jeff Gerth writes,
I’ve avoided opining in my more than fifty years as a reporter. This time, however, I felt obligated to weigh in. Why? Because I am worried about journalism’s declining credibility and society’s increasing polarization. The two trends, I believe, are intertwined. My main conclusion is that journalism’s primary missions, informing the public and holding powerful interests accountable, have been undermined by the erosion of journalistic norms and the media’s own lack of transparency about its work. This combination adds to people’s distrust about the media and exacerbates frayed political and social differences.[34]
Media and pillarization
Profitability of spectacle and outrage
Examining trumpism as an entertainment product, some media research focuses on the heavy reliance on outrage discourse which in terms of media coverage privileged Trump's rhetoric over that of other candidates due to the symbiotic relationship between his focus on the entertainment value of such storytelling and the commercial interests of media companies.[35] A unique form of incivility, the use of outrage narratives on political blogs, talk radio and cable news opinion shows had in the decades prior become representative of a relatively new political opinion media genre which had experienced significant growth due to its profitability.[36][37] Media critic David Denby writes, "Like a good standup comic, Trump invites the audience to join him in the adventure of delivering his act—in this case, the barbarously entertaining adventure of running a Presidential campaign that insults everybody." Denby's claim is that Trump is simply good at delivering the kind of political entertainment product consumers demand. He observes that "The movement's standard of allowable behavior has been formed by popular culture—by standup comedy and, recently, by reality TV and by the snarking, trolling habits of the Internet. You can't effectively say that Donald Trump is vulgar, sensational, and buffoonish when it's exactly vulgar sensationalism and buffoonery that his audience is buying. Donald Trump has been produced by America."[38] Although Trump's outrage discourse was characterized by fictional assertions, mean spirited attacks against various groups and dog whistle appeals to racial and religious intolerance, media executives could not ignore its profitability. CBS's CEO Les Moonves remarked that "It may not be good for America, but it's damn good for CBS,"[39] demonstrating how Trumpism's form of messaging and the commercial goals of media companies are not only compatible but mutually lucrative.[40] Peter Wehner, senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center considers Trump a political "shock jock" who "thrives on creating disorder, in violating rules, in provoking outrage."[41]
The political profitability of incivility was demonstrated by the extraordinary amount of free airtime gifted to Trump's 2016 primary campaign—estimated at two billion dollars,[42] which according to media tracking companies grew to almost five billion by the end of the national campaign.[43] The advantage of incivility was as true in social media, where "a BuzzFeed analysis found that the top 20 fake election news stories emanating from hoax sites and hyperpartisan blogs generated more engagement on Facebook (as measured by shares, reactions, and comments) than the top 20 election stories produced by 19 major news outlets combined, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Huffington Post, and NBC News."[44]
Social media
Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump My use of social media is not Presidential – it's MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL. Make America Great Again!
July 1, 2017[45]
Surveying research of how Trumpist communication is well suited to social media, Brian Ott writes that, "commentators who have studied Trump's public discourse have observed speech patterns that correspond closely to what I identified as Twitter's three defining features [Simplicity, impulsivity, and incivility]."[46] Media critic Neal Gabler has a similar viewpoint writing that "What FDR was to radio and JFK to television, Trump is to Twitter."[47] Outrage discourse expert Patrick O'Callaghan argues that social media is most effective when it utilizes the particular type of communication which Trump relies on. O'Callaghan notes that sociologist Sarah Sobieraj and political scientist Jeffrey M. Berry almost perfectly described in 2011 the social media communication style used by Trump long before his presidential campaign.[48] They explained that such discourse "[involves] efforts to provoke visceral responses (e.g., anger, righteousness, fear, moral indignation) from the audience through the use of overgeneralizations, sensationalism, misleading or patently inaccurate information, ad hominem attacks, and partial truths about opponents, who may be individuals, organizations, or entire communities of interest (e.g., progressives or conservatives) or circumstance (e.g., immigrants). Outrage sidesteps the messy nuances of complex political issues in favor of melodrama, misrepresentative exaggeration, mockery, and improbable forecasts of impending doom. Outrage talk is not so much discussion as it is verbal competition, political theater with a scorecard."[49]
Due to Facebook's and Twitter's narrowcasting environment in which outrage discourse thrives, Trump's employment of such messaging at almost every opportunity was from O'Callaghan's account extremely effective because tweets and posts were repeated in viral fashion among like minded supporters, thereby rapidly building a substantial information echo chamber,[50] a phenomenon Cass Sunstein identifies as group polarization,[51] and other researchers refer to as a kind of self re-enforcing homophily.[52] Within these information cocoons, it matters little to social media companies whether much of the information spread in such pillarized information silos is false, because as digital culture critic Olivia Solon points out, "the truth of a piece of content is less important than whether it is shared, liked, and monetized."[53] Citing Pew Research's survey that found 62% of US adults get their news from social media,[54] Ott expresses alarm, "since the 'news' content on social media regularly features fake and misleading stories from sources devoid of editorial standards."[55] Media critic Alex Ross is similarly alarmed, observing, "Silicon Valley monopolies have taken a hands-off, ideologically vacant attitude toward the upswelling of ugliness on the Internet," and that "the failure of Facebook to halt the proliferation of fake news during the [Trump vs. Clinton] campaign season should have surprised no one. ... Traffic trumps ethics."[56]
O'Callaghan's analysis of Trump's use of social media is that "outrage hits an emotional nerve and is therefore grist to the populist's or the social antagonist's mill. Secondly, the greater and the more widespread the outrage discourse, the more it has a detrimental effect on social capital. This is because it leads to mistrust and misunderstanding amongst individuals and groups, to entrenched positions, to a feeling of 'us versus them'. So understood, outrage discourse not only produces extreme and polarising views but also ensures that a cycle of such views continues. (Consider also in this context Wade Robison (2020) on the 'contagion of passion'[57] and Cass Sunstein (2001, pp. 98–136) on 'cybercascades'.)"[50] Ott agrees, stating that contagion is the best word to describe the viral nature of outrage discourse on social media, and writing that "Trump's simple, impulsive, and uncivil Tweets do more than merely reflect sexism, racism, homophobia, and xenophobia; they spread those ideologies like a social cancer."[58] Robison warns that emotional contagion should not be confused with the contagion of passions that James Madison and David Hume were concerned with. Robison states they underestimated the contagion of passions mechanism at work in movements, whose modern expressions include the surprising phenomena of rapidly mobilized social media supporters behind both the Arab Spring and the Trump presidential campaign writing, "It is not that we experience something and then, assessing it, become passionate about it, or not", and implying that "we have the possibility of a check on our passions." Robison's view is that the contagion affects the way reality itself is experienced by supporters because it leverages how subjective certainty is triggered, so that those experiencing the contagiously shared alternate reality are unaware they have taken on a belief they should assess.[59]
Foreign policy
In terms of foreign policy in the sense of Trump's "America First", unilateralism is preferred to a multilateral policy and national interests are particularly emphasized, especially in the context of economic treaties and alliance obligations.[60][61] Trump has shown a disdain for traditional American allies such as Canada as well as transatlantic partners NATO and the European Union.[62][63] Conversely, Trump has shown sympathy for autocratic rulers, such as Russian president Vladimir Putin, whom Trump often praised even before taking office,[64] and during the 2018 Russia–United States summit.[65] The "America First" foreign policy includes promises by Trump to end American involvement in foreign wars, notably in the Middle East, while also issuing tighter foreign policy through sanctions against Iran, among other countries.[66][67]
Economic policy
In terms of economic policy, Trumpism "promises new jobs and more domestic investment".[68] Trump's hard line against export surpluses of American trading partners and general protectionist trade policies led to a tense situation in 2018 with mutually imposed punitive tariffs between the United States on the one hand and the European Union and China on the other.[69] Trump secures the support of his political base with a policy that strongly emphasizes neo-nationalism and criticism of globalization.[70] In contrast, the book Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America suggested that Trump "radicalized economics" to his base of white working- to middle-class voters by the promoting the idea that "undeserving [minority] groups are getting ahead while their group is being left behind."[71]
See also
- America First policy under the presidency of Donald Trump
- American nationalism in the Donald Trump presidency
- Civil rights movement
- Cult of personality
- Firehosing
- John Birch Society
- The Lincoln Project
- List of conspiracy theories promoted by Donald Trump
- Political positions of Donald Trump
- Presidency of Donald Trump
- Reagan Democrat
- Reality distortion field
- Republican Voters Against Trump
- Alt-right
- Fascism in the United States
- Radical right (United States)
References
- ^ Tabachnick, David Edward (January 5, 2016). "The four characteristics of Trumpism". The Hill. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ "Trumpism". definition in the Cambridge English Dictionary. March 27, 2024. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Hartig, Hannah (August 25, 2020). "Stark partisan divisions in Americans' views of 'socialism,' 'capitalism'". Pew Research Center. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Novack, George (May 13, 1957). "The Rise and Fall of Progressivism". Marxists Internet Archive. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Foster, John Bellamy (June 1, 2017). "This Is Not Populism". Monthly Review. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ a b Tabachnick, David Edward (January 5, 2016). "The four characteristics of Trumpism". The Hill. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ The Sydney Morning Herald, February 3, 2017 ; Politico, February 23, 2017 ; Time (magazine), March 10, 2017 ; NBC News, March 13, 2017 ; The Korea Herald, April 5, 2017 ; The Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2017 ; The New York Times, May 7, 2018 ; The Irish Times, June 25, 2018 ; Vanity Fair, November 5, 2018 ; BBC News, December 31, 2018 ; The New York Times, May 14, 2019 ; The Atlantic, September 5, 2019 ; Newsweek, December 23, 2019 ; The National Interest, September 17, 2020 ; Politico, January 9, 2021 ; The Washington Post, January 15, 2021 ; The Independent, July 2, 2021 .
- ^ Continetti 2020.
- ^ de la Torre et al. 2019, p. 6.
- ^ Brewster 2020.
- ^ Winberg, Oscar (July 31, 2017). "Insult Politics: Donald Trump, Right-Wing Populism, and Incendiary Language". European journal of American studies. European Association for American Studies (12–2). doi:10.4000/ejas.12132. ISSN 1991-9336. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Jutel 2019.
- ^ Kimmel 2017, p. xi.
- ^ Kimmel & Wade 2018, p. 243.
- ^ Kimmel 2017, p. 18.
- ^ de la Torre et al. 2019, pp. 6, 37, 50, 102, 206.
- ^ Fuchs 2018, pp. 83–84.
- ^ Kuhn 2017.
- ^ Serwer 2017.
- ^ Huddleston, Robert S. (January 12, 2024). "How 'Woke' Is the Campus Left?". The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Gordon 2018, p. 79.
- ^ Stoler 2020, p. 117.
- ^ Tucker 2018, p. 134.
- ^ Carpini 2018, pp. 18–19.
- ^ Jacquemet 2020, p. 187.
- ^ Plasser & Ulram 2003.
- ^ Jutel 2019, pp. 249, 255.
- ^ Johnson 2018.
- ^ Postman 2005, p. 106.
- ^ Ott 2017, p. 66.
- ^ Beer 2021.
- ^ Gerth, Jeff (January 30, 2023). "The press versus the president, part one". Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Pope, Kyle (June 5, 2020). "Looking back on the coverage of Trump". Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Gerth, Jeff (October 16, 2019). "The press versus the president, part four". Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved March 30, 2024.
- ^ Waisbord, Tucker & Lichtenheld 2018, pp. 29, 31.
- ^ Sobieraj & Berry 2011.
- ^ Berry & Sobieraj 2014.
- ^ Denby 2015.
- ^ Bond 2016.
- ^ Waisbord, Tucker & Lichtenheld 2018, p. 31.
- ^ Wehner 2017.
- ^ Confessore & Yourish 2016.
- ^ Waisbord, Tucker & Lichtenheld 2018, p. 30.
- ^ Carpini 2018, p. 17.
- ^ Donald J. Trump [@realDonaldTrump] (July 1, 2017). "My use of social media is not Presidential – it's MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL. Make America Great Again!" (Tweet). Archived from the original on July 2, 2017 – via Twitter.
- ^ Ott 2017, p. 63.
- ^ Gabler 2016.
- ^ O'Callaghan 2020, p. 115.
- ^ Sobieraj & Berry 2011, p. 20.
- ^ a b O'Callaghan 2020, p. 116.
- ^ Sunstein 2007, p. 60.
- ^ Massachs et al. 2020, p. 2.
- ^ Solon 2016.
- ^ Gottfried & Shearer 2016.
- ^ Ott 2017, p. 65.
- ^ Ross 2016.
- ^ Robison 2020, p. 180.
- ^ Ott 2017, p. 64.
- ^ Robison 2020, p. 182.
- ^ Rudolf 2017.
- ^ Assheuer 2018.
- ^ Smith & Townsend 2018.
- ^ Tharoor 2018.
- ^ Diamond 2016.
- ^ Kuhn 2018.
- ^ Zengerle 2019.
- ^ Wintour 2020.
- ^ Harwood 2017.
- ^ Partington 2018.
- ^ Thompson 2017.
- ^ O'Connor 2020.
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