Hamas

"Islamic Resistance Movement" redirects here. Not to be confused with Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan or Islamic Resistance Movement (Iraq).

Islamic Resistance Movement حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
Spokesperson	Fawzi Barhoum
Chairman	Ismail Haniyeh
Deputy Chairman	Saleh al-Arouri
Founder	Ahmed Yassin Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi ... and others Mahmoud Zahar Mohammad Taha Abdel Fattah Dukhan Ibrahim Fares Al-Yazouri 'Isa al-Nashshar Ibrahim Quqa Mohammed Hassan Shama'a Hassan Yousef
Founded	10 December 1987 (1987-12-10)
Split from	Muslim Brotherhood
Headquarters	Gaza City, Gaza Strip
Military wing	Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Ideology	Palestinian nationalism Islamism Islamic nationalism Anti-Zionism Anti-communism Antisemitism
Religion	Sunni Islam
Political alliance	Alliance of Palestinian Forces
Colours	Green
Most seats in the PLC (c. 2006)	74 / 132
Website
hamas.ps
Politics of Palestine Political parties Elections

Headquarters	Gaza City, Gaza Strip
Allies	State allies: Afghanistan (Taliban) Iran Libya (HoR) Qatar Syria (until 2011, again since 2022 sometimes) Non-state allies: Hezbollah
Opponents	State opponents: Egypt Israel Jordan Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Non-state opponents: Fatah People's Mujahedin of Iran
Battles and wars	Israel–Palestine conflict Fatah–Hamas conflict
Designated as a terrorist group by	Australia Canada European Union Israel Japan Organization of American States Paraguay United Kingdom United States

Hamas (Arabic: حماس, romanized: Ḥamās, IPA: [ħaˈmaːs]; an acronym of حركة المقاومة الإسلامية Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, lit. 'Islamic Resistance Movement') is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organization, with roots to the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in December 1987 in the Gaza Strip during the First Intifada, Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Gaza branch, established in 1946 under Egypt’s administration. Their leader Ismail Haniyeh is based in Qatar. Hamas has been designated as a terrorist organization by Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is not considered a terrorist organization by Brazil, China, Egypt, Iran, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Syria and Turkey. In December 2018, a UN resolution for all members to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization failed to pass the United Nations General Assembly. The social service wing for Hamas is Dawah, and their military wing is the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Following the 2007 Battle of Gaza, Hamas prevailed in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, and became the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip. It holds a majority in the parliament of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Hamas has vowed to obliterate Israel" as stated in the Hamas Doctrine. Hamas is responsible for many suicide bombings and other deadly attacks on civilians and Israeli soldiers. On October 7, 2023, armed terrorists launched a surprise attack on Israel that coincided with the Jewish Sabbath and a religious holiday. They pushed their way into Israeli towns on bulldozers, motorbikes, and hang gliders killing an unverified number of Israelis, reported to be anywhere from 700–1400, while kidnapping dozens or possibly hundreds of hostages, including women, children and infants. French President Emmanuel Macron referred to it as "the worst terrorist attack in Israel's history." During the first four weeks of Israel's retaliation, which involved an intensified military offense, approximately 10,000 people in Gaza were killed.

As of March 2025, according to Gaza health officials, more than 48,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed in Israeli strikes during the subsequent war, creating a humanitarian crisis in the region. Israel believes 24 hostages remain alive in Gaza, with the bodies of dozens more still held by Palestinian terrorists. Mediators in Qatar have been negotiating a ceasefire deal to release more than half of the remaining hostages. Its official narrative claims a militant legacy dating to 1935, tied to ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam’s fight against British rule, while some argue it was shaped by Israeli intelligence post-1967 to counter the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—claims that historical analysis largely refutes.

False claims have circulated in media that Israel created Hamas or that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported Hamas. Hamas is an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna—before the 1948 rebirth of the State of Israel—which now operates globally, including in Israel, the United States, and Europe under various names and front groups, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations. In its early days, the Muslim Brotherhood coordinated with Nazi Germany and received support from it. Initially, Hamas resembled the Brotherhood’s branches in Israel, focusing on religion, social work, and non-violent politics, before revealing its true agenda of armed resistance. When the Bush administration pushed for elections in the Palestinian Authority in 2006 as part of its democracy agenda, Hamas won decisively, leading the Palestinian Authority to suspend future elections to avoid further losses to Hamas.

Overview

Hamas was founded in 1987, after the First Intifada broke out, as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which in its Gaza branch, established in 1946, had previously been nonconfrontational toward Israel and hostile to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Co-founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin said in 1987, and the Hamas Charter affirmed in 1988, that Hamas was founded to liberate Palestine, including Israel, from Israeli occupation and to establish an Islamic state in the area that later is Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s parent organization, was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna and has a long history predating Israel’s existence, with roots in Egypt—where the Gaza Strip was once ruled—explaining its strong presence there. During Egypt’s administration of Gaza (1948–1967), the Brotherhood was not consistently militant, even heading the Gaza municipality in 1952, and its early fighters contributed to the founding of Fatah—complicating claims of unbroken militancy or Israeli creation. The Brotherhood tends to operate by presenting itself as political and non-violent until it can seize power, a pattern Hamas followed as it gained strength in Gaza. Israel, like the United States and Europe, was initially misled by this approach, viewing Hamas as a religious and political entity rather than a terrorist group—until its violent agenda became undeniable.

Since 1994, the group has stated that it would accept a truce if Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, paid reparations, allowed free elections in the territories and gave Palestinian refugees the right to return. However, as of March 2025, Israel seeks a different deal: a temporary ceasefire extension and partial hostage release in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, refusing to withdraw troops from Gaza’s border with Egypt or commit to ending the war while Hamas remains in control.

Israel and Hamas have engaged in wars, with Hamas’s military wing launching attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers, describing them as retaliations, in particular for assassinations of the upper echelon of their leadership. Tactics have included suicide bombings and, since 2001, rocket attacks. Hamas’s rocket arsenal, while mainly consisting of homemade Qassam rockets with a range of 16 km (9.9 mi), also includes Grad-type rockets (21 km (13 mi) by 2009) and longer-range (40 km (25 mi)) that have reached Israeli towns such as Beer Sheva and Ashdod, and some that have struck cities like Tel Aviv and Haifa. Human Rights Watch has condemned as war crimes and crimes against humanity both Hamas’s and Israel’s attacks on civilians during the conflict, stating that the rationale of reprisals is never valid when civilians are targeted. Israel and Hamas have engaged in wars. Hamas's military wing has launched attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers, describing them as retaliations, in particular for assassinations of the upper echelon of their leadership. Tactics have included suicide bombings and, since 2001, rocket attacks. Hamas's rocket arsenal, while mainly consisting of homemade Qassam rockets with a range of 16 km (9.9 mi), also includes Grad-type rockets (21 km (13 mi) by 2009) and longer-range (40 km (25 mi)) that have reached Israeli towns such as Beer Sheva and Ashdod, and some that have struck cities like Tel Aviv and Haifa. Human Rights Watch has condemned as war crimes and crimes against humanity both Hamas's and Israel's attacks on civilians during the conflict, stating that the rationale of reprisals is never valid when civilians are targeted.

In the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority in the PNA Parliament, defeating the PLO-affiliated Fatah party. After the elections, the Quartet (the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States) made future foreign assistance to the PNA conditional upon the PNA’s commitment to nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. Hamas rejected those conditions, which led the Quartet to suspend its foreign assistance program and Israel to impose economic sanctions on the Hamas-led administration.

In March 2007, a national unity government headed by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas was formed, and this failed to restart international financial assistance. Tensions over control of Palestinian security forces erupted in the 2007 Battle of Gaza, after which Hamas took control of Gaza, while its officials were ousted from government positions in the West Bank. Hamas then fought and defeated the Palestinian Authority (essentially synonymous with Fatah and the PLO) in Gaza, solidifying its control with support from Muslim Brotherhood networks worldwide, as well as state sponsors like Iran and Qatar. Israel and Egypt then imposed an economic blockade of the Gaza Strip on the grounds that Fatah forces were no longer providing security there. Social media has circulated claims, often citing the Israeli outlet Haaretz, that Netanyahu funded Hamas to thwart a Palestinian state. In reality, Israel allowed Qatar to deliver cash to Hamas as part of Egyptian-brokered truces—such as one in 2018—to reduce violence, not to empower Hamas, though critics argue this policy emboldened the group. As of March 2025, mediators in Qatar continue to pursue ceasefire agreements, with Israel blocking all aid to Gaza to pressure Hamas, a tactic condemned by humanitarian groups, while past truces have failed to halt the recurring cycle of violence.

Etymology

Hamas is an acronym of the Arabic phrase حركة المقاومة الإسلامية or Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, meaning "Islamic Resistance Movement". This acronym, HMS, was later glossed in the Hamas Covenant by the Arabic word ḥamās (حماس) which itself means "zeal", "strength", or "bravery". In Hebrew, there is a similar-sounding word, ḥāmās (חמס) connoting "violence", a phonetic resemblance that possibly helped further Israeli negative perceptions of the Palestinian movement.

Organization

Leadership and structure

Map of key Hamas leadership nodes. 2010

Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure that consisted in the provision of social services, of religious training and military operations under a Shura Council. Traditionally it had 4 functions: (a) a charitable social welfare division (dawah); (b) a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations (al-Mujahideen al Filastinun); (c) a security service (Jehaz Aman); and (d) a media branch (A'alam). Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an external leadership, split between a Gaza group directed by Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt, and a Kuwaiti group (Kuwaidia) under Khaled Mashal. The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the Gulf States after its leader Mashal broke with Yasser Arafat's decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the Invasion of Kuwait, with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw. On May 6, 2017, Hamas' Shura Council chose Ismail Haniya to become the new leader, to replace Mashal.

The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities. Formally, Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent, and this has been questioned. It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity. Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants. After the assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders given wider discretional autonomy over operations.

Consultative councils

The governing body is the Majlis al-Shura. The principle behind the council is based on the Qur'anic concept of consultation and popular assembly (shura), which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework. As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased it needed a broader base for decisions, the Shura Council was renamed the 'General Consultative Council', elected from members of local council groups and this in turn elected a 15-member Politburo (al-Maktab al-Siyasi) that made decisions at the highest level. Representatives come from Gaza, the West Bank, leaders in exile and Israeli prisons. This organ was located in Damascus until the Syrian Civil War led it to transfer to Qatar in January 2012, when Hamas sided with the civil opposition against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Finances and funding

Hamas, like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed the administration of Gaza's waqf properties, endowments which extend over 10% of all real estate in the Gaza Strip, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with numerous shops, rentable apartments and public buildings.

In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 30–50% as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the Palestinian expatriates in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–1992 Gulf War. At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read George H. W. Bush's outline of a New World Order as embodying a tacit aim to destroy Islam, and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories. Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity—military, political and social services. It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem (Beit al-Mal), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and al-Ajouli money-changing firm.

By 2011, Hamas's budget, calculated to be roughly US$70 million, derived even more substantially (85%) from foreign, rather than internal Palestinian, sources. Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror. It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud. The United States, Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief. Between 1992 and 2001, this group is said to have provided $6.8 million to Palestinian charities of the $57 million collected. By 2001, it was alleged to have given Hamas $13 million, and was shut down shortly afterwards.

About half of Hamas's funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid 2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of $50 million in the early 2000s, but, under U.S. pressure, began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004, which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall. Saudi funding, negotiated with third parties like Egypt, remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid. During the 1980s, Iran began to provide 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30 million. It accounted for $22 million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s. According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks. Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through Hezbollah. After 2006, Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom. The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas. The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the Foz do Iguaçu area of the tri-border region of Latin America, an area long associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking.

After 2009, sanctions on Iran made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150 million in 2012 to $60 million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked. The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism, saying: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."

Social services wing

Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance. In Islamic tradition, dawah (lit. transl. "the call to God") obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both waqf endowment resources and charitable donations (zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam) to fund grassroots services like nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions. In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services. Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza. Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt. As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions like financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction. A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other.

The dawah infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower.{{efn|'In a 1995 lecture, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership, expounded the importance of Hamas' dawa infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower.' In this regard it differs from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad which lacks any social welfare network, and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents. In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60 million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen laid idle by Israel's imposition of restrictions on fishing offshore, plus grants totalling $45 million to detainees and their families. Matthew Levitt argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others. Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance. Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less.

Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip. After the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.

Military wing

Main article: Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Weapons found in a mosque during Operation Cast Lead, according to the IDF

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is Hamas's military wing. By the time of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas's laboratories had devised a primitive form of rocketry, the Qassam 1, which they first launched in October 2000, carrying a 500 g (18 oz) warhead with a throw range of 4 km (2.5 mi). Both propellant and the explosive were manufactured from chemical fertilizers, though TNT was also tried. Over the next five years of the conflict, a 3 kg (6.6 lb)-warhead-armed version with a strike range of 6 km (3.7 mi)–8 km (5.0 mi), the Qassam 2, was also produced and in an incremental rise, these rocket types were fired towards Israeli settlements along the Gaza Strip: 4 in 2001, 35 in 2002, 155 in 2003, 281 in 2004, and 179 in 2005. By 2005, the Qassam 3 had been engineered with a 12 km (7.5 mi)–14 km (8.7 mi) range and a 15 kg (33 lb) warhead. By 2006, 942 such rockets were launched into southern Israel. During the War with Israel in 2008–2009, Hamas deployed 122-mm Grad rocketry with a 20 km (12 mi)–40 km (25 mi) range and a 30 kg (66 lb) warhead and a variety of guided Kornet antitank missiles. By 2012 Hamas had engineered a version of the Fajr-5 rocket, which was capable of reaching as far as Tel Aviv, as was shown after the assassination of Ahmed Jabari in that year. In the 2014 war its advanced rocketry reached Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa.

While the number of members is known only to the Brigades leadership, Israel estimates the Brigades have a core of several hundred members who receive military style training, including training in Iran and in Syria (before the Syrian Civil War). Additionally, the brigades have an estimated 10,000–17,000 operatives, forming a backup force whenever circumstances call for reinforcements for the Brigade. Recruitment training lasts for two years. The group's ideology outlines its aim as the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Palestinian rights under the dispensations set forth in the Qur'an, and this translates into three policy priorities:

To evoke the spirit of Jihad (Resistance) among Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims; to defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its manifestations; to liberate Palestinians and their land that was usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers.

According to its official stipulations, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades' military operations are to be restricted to operating only inside Palestine, engaging with Israeli soldiers, and in exercising the right of self-defense against armed settlers. They are to avoid civilian targets, to respect the enemy's humanity by refraining from mutilation, defacement or excessive killing, and to avoid targeting Westerners either in the occupied zones or beyond.

Exercise of al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza City, 27 January 2013

Down to 2007, the Brigades are estimated to have lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces. The leadership has been consistently undermined by targeted assassinations. Aside from Yahya Ayyash (January 5, 1996), it has lost Emad Akel (November 24, 1993), Salah Shehade (July 23, 2002), Ibrahim al-Makadmeh (March 8, 2003), Ismail Abu Shanab (August 21, 2003), Ahmed Yassin (March 22, 2004), and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (April 17, 2004).

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades groups its fighters in 4–5 man cells, which in turn are integrated into companies and battalions. Unlike the political section, which is split between an internal and external structure, the Brigades are under a local Palestinian leadership, and disobedience with the decisions taken by the political leadership have been relatively rare.

Although the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are an integral part of Hamas, the exact nature of the relationship is hotly debated. They appear to operate at times independently of Hamas, exercising a certain autonomy. Some cells have independent links with the external leadership, enabling them to bypass the hierarchical command chain and political leadership in Gaza. Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, likening Hamas's relationship with the Brigades to the political party Sinn Féin's relationship to the military arm of the Irish Republican Army. quote a senior Hamas official as stating: "The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing, which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from Hamas and do not tell us of their plans in advance."

Media

Al-Aqsa TV

Main article: Al-Aqsa TV

Al-Aqsa TV is a television channel founded by Hamas. The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9, 2006, less than three weeks before the Palestinian legislative elections. It has shown television programs, including some children's television, which deliver anti-semitic messages. Hamas has stated that the television station is "an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement," and that Hamas does not hold anti-semitic views. The programming includes ideologically tinged children's shows, news talk, and religiously inspired entertainment. According to the Anti-Defamation League, the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis. Al-Aqsa TV is headed by Fathi Ahmad Hammad, chairman of al-Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions—a Hamas-run company that also produces Hamas's radio station, Voice of al-Aqsa, and its biweekly newspaper, The Message.

Children's magazine

Main article: Al-Fateh

Al-Fateh ("the conqueror") is the Hamas children's magazine, published biweekly in London, and also posted in an online website. It began publication in September 2002, and its 108th issue was released in mid-September 2007. The magazine features stories, poems, riddles, and puzzles, and states it is for "the young builders of the future".

According to the Anti-Defamation League, al-Fateh promotes violence and anti-semitism, with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers, and that it "regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained, injured or killed by Israeli police, images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs."

History of Hamas

Main article: History of Hamas

Hamas, founded in 1987 as an offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, emerged during the First Intifada with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as a key figure, evolving from a social-religious movement into a Palestinian Islamist terrorist organization with its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Initially focused on charity and Islamic reform in Gaza, it shifted to armed resistance against Israel, as outlined in its 1988 charter calling for Israel’s destruction through jihad. Hamas gained prominence through suicide bombings and rocket attacks, notably during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), and won the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, leading to its 2007 takeover of Gaza after ousting Fatah in a violent clash. Since then, it has governed Gaza, engaging in multiple conflicts with Israel, including the 2008–2009 Gaza War, while expanding its arsenal and tunnel networks. Its history reflects a blend of militancy, governance, and shifting political stances, detailed further in the main article.

Terrorist designation

Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries. The United States classified Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997 (not 1995 as previously stated), followed by Canada in November 2002, and the United Kingdom in November 2021, when it proscribed the entire organization, not just its military wing. The European Union designated Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as a terrorist entity in 2001 and extended this to the entire organization in 2003.</ref> Hamas challenged the EU designation, but the European Court of Justice upheld it in July 2017, ruling that media and internet reports were sufficient to maintain the listing after initial competent authority decisions. Japan and New Zealand have designated only the military wing as a terrorist organization, while Jordan banned Hamas outright in 1999.

Hamas is not classified as a terrorist organization by Iran, Russia, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, China, Egypt, Syria, and Brazil. Many of these states view Hamas’s armed struggle as legitimate resistance rather than terrorism.

Some analysts note that while Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by Israel, the U.S., and the EU, its status has shifted in the Arab and Muslim world, where it is no longer treated as a pariah and its representatives are received in various capitals. While several governments and academics classify Hamas as a terrorist group, others see it as a multifaceted organization, with terrorism as only one aspect alongside its political and social roles.

Country	Designation
Algeria	Algeria voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Australia	Australia announced they would designate Hamas as a terrorist organization in its entirety in 2022. Prior to that, Hamas' military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, were recognized as one but the political branch were not.
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Bahrain	Bahrain voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Bangladesh	Bangladesh voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Belarus	Belarus voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Bolivia	Bolivia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Botswana	Botswana voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Brazil	Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Brazil.
Brunei	Brunei voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Canada	Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Government of Canada currently lists Hamas as a terrorist entity, thus establishing it as a terrorist group, since 2002.
China	As of 2006, China does not designate Hamas to be a terrorist organization and acknowledges Hamas to be the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip that represents the Palestinian people. In June 2006, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "We believe that the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected."
Comoros	Comoros voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Congo	The Congo voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Cuba	Cuba voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Djibouti	Azerbaijan voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Egypt	In June 2015, Egypt's appeals court overturned a prior ruling that listed Hamas as a terrorist organization. In February 2015, Cairo's Urgent Matters Court designated Hamas as a terrorist organization, as part of a crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood movement following the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état. The court accused Hamas of carrying terrorist attacks in Egypt through tunnels linking the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip. In March 2014, the same court outlawed Hamas' activities in Egypt, ordered the closure of its offices and to arrest any Hamas member found in the country.
European Union	The EU designated Hamas as a terrorist group from 2003. In December 2014, the General Court of the European Union ordered to remove HAMAS from the register. The court stated that the move was technical and was not a reassessment of Hamas' classification as a terrorist group. In March 2015, EU decided to keep Hamas on its terrorism blacklist "despite a controversial court decision", appealing the court's judgment. In July 2017, this appeal was upheld by the European Court of Justice.
Gambia	The Gambia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Guinea	Guinea voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Indonesia	Indonesia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Iran	Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Iran.
Iraq	Iraq voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Israel	The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, "Hamas maintains a terrorist infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank, and acts to carry out terrorist attacks in the territories and Israel."
Japan	As of 2005, Japan had frozen the assets of 472 terrorists and terrorist organizations including those of Hamas. However, in 2006 it publicly acknowledged that Hamas had won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections democratically.
Jordan	Hamas was banned in 1999, reportedly in part at the request of the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. In 2019, Jordanian sources are said to have revealed "that the Kingdom refused a request from the General Secretariat of the Arab League in late March to ban Hamas and list it as a terrorist organization."
Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Kuwait	Kuwait voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Laos	Laos voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Lebanon	Lebanon voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Libya	Libya voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Malaysia	Malaysia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Maldives	The Maldives voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Mali	Mali voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Mauritania	Mauritania voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Mauritius	Mauritius voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Morocco	Morocco voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Mozambique	Mozambique voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Namibia	Namibia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
New Zealand	The military wing of Hamas, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been listed as a terrorist entity since 2010.
Nicaragua	Nicaragua voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Niger	Niger voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Nigeria	Nigeria voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Norway	Norway does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. In 2006, Norway distanced itself from the European Union, "claiming that it was causing problems for its role as a 'neutral facilitator.'"
Oman	Oman voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Organization of American States	OAS designated Hamas a terrorist organization in May 2021.
Pakistan	Pakistan voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Paraguay	The military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is listed as a terrorist organization.
Qatar	The Qatari government has a designated terrorist list. As of 2014, the list contained no names, according to The Daily Telegraph. In September 2020, Qatar brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that is reported to include "plans to build a power station operated by Qatar, the provision of $34 million for humanitarian aid, provision of 20,000 COVID-19 testing kits by Qatar to the Health Ministry, and a number of initiatives to reduce unemployment in the Gaza Strip."
Russia	Russia does not designate Hamas a terrorist organisation, and held direct talks with Hamas in 2006, after Hamas won the Palestine elections, stating that it did so to press Hamas to reject violence and recognise Israel.
Saudi Arabia	Banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 2014 and branded it a terrorist organization. While Hamas is not specifically listed, a non-official Saudi source stated that the decision also encompasses its branches in other countries, including Hamas. As of January 2020, ties between Saudi Arabia and Hamas remain strained despite attempts at a rapprochement. Wesam Afifa, director general of Al-Aqsa TV is quoted as saying that "Saudi Arabia did not sever ties with Hamas, and even when Riyadh made public its list of terrorists in 2017, Hamas was not added to the list."
Senegal	Senegal voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Somalia	Somalia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
South Africa	South Africa voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Sudan	Sudan voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Suriname	Suriname voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Switzerland	Switzerland does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. In accordance with Swiss neutrality, its policy of contact with the main actors of a conflict is characterized by impartial inclusiveness, discretion and pragmatism. Switzerland has direct contacts with all major stakeholders in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including Hamas.
Syria	Syria does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. Syria is among other countries that consider Hamas' armed struggle to be legitimate.
Tunisia	Tunisia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Turkey	The Turkish government met with Hamas leaders in February 2006, after the organization's victory in the Palestinian elections. In 2010, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described Hamas as "resistance fighters who are struggling to defend their land".
United Arab Emirates	The UAE voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
United Kingdom	Hamas in its entirety is proscribed as a terrorist group and banned under the Terrorism Act."The government now assess that the approach of distinguishing between the various parts of Hamas is artificial. Hamas is a complex but single terrorist organisation."
United Nations	The list of United Nations designated terrorist groups does not include Hamas. On 5 December 2018, the UN rejected a U.S. resolution aimed at unilaterally condemning Hamas for Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel and other violence.
United States	Lists Hamas as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" The State Department decided to add Hamas to its U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in April 1993. As of 2009, Hamas is still listed.
Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Venezuela	Venezuela voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Vietnam	Vietnam voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Yemen	Yemen voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Zambia	Zambia voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.

Criticism

See also: Racism in the Palestinian territories

Hamas has faced criticism from various entities for its policies, military tactics, and governance practices, as documented in its charters and official actions. This section outlines these criticisms based on verifiable evidence.

Australia

Designation: Australia has criticized Hamas for its military actions against Israel, designating it a terrorist organization in its entirety since February 17, 2022. Prior to this, only its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was listed since 2003. The Australian government cites Hamas’s rocket attacks and suicide bombings as threats to civilian safety.

Canada

Designation: Canada lists Hamas as a terrorist entity under the Anti-Terrorism Act since November 2002, citing its charter’s call for Israel’s destruction and its history of attacks on civilians, including the 1994 Tel Aviv bus bombing.

European Union

Designation: The EU designated Hamas’s military wing as a terrorist group in 2001 and the entire organization in 2003, upheld by the European Court of Justice in 2017. Criticism focuses on its 1988 Charter’s rejection of Israel’s existence and documented attacks, such as the 2006 kidnapping of Gilad Shalit.

Human Rights Watch

Designation: Human Rights Watch (HRW) does not designate Hamas but has criticized its military tactics and governance. In 2012, HRW reported Hamas fired rockets from densely populated Gaza areas, endangering civilians, a violation of international law. A 2012 report documented 102 cases of torture by Hamas against Palestinians, including beatings and hangings.

Israel

Designation: Israel designates Hamas a terrorist organization, stating it "maintains a terrorist infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank" to carry out attacks. Israel cites over 12,000 rockets and mortars fired from Gaza between 2000 and 2008, with 3,000 in 2008 alone, and accuses Hamas of using civilian areas for military purposes.

United Kingdom

Designation: The UK proscribed Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist group in November 2021, citing its unified structure and attacks on Israeli civilians, such as the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict rocket barrages.

United Nations

Designation: The UN does not list Hamas as a terrorist organization but has faced criticism related to its actions. The 2009 Goldstone Report found credible evidence of Hamas militants blending with civilians during the Gaza conflict, though it found no intent to use civilians as shields.

United States

Designation: The U.S. designated Hamas a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997, citing its 1988 Charter’s call for Israel’s destruction and attacks like the 1996 murder of Yaron and Efrat Ungar. The FBI in 2005 noted Hamas’s U.S. presence focuses on fundraising, with a limited threat of attacks.

Amnesty International

Designation: Amnesty International does not designate Hamas but criticized it in 2015 for extrajudicial killings and torture of at least 23 Palestinians during the 2014 Gaza conflict, often targeting Fatah members, using facilities like Al-Shifa Hospital for detentions.

Human shields

A Hamas rocket launch site and its civilian surroundings.

Human Rights Watch - Rocket Launches from Civilian Areas

Designation: Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported after Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 that Hamas fired rockets from densely populated Gaza areas, endangering civilians. Specific incidents included a rocket launched near the Shawa and Housari Building, housing media offices, and another from a yard near the Deira Hotel. HRW noted this violated international law by placing military targets in civilian zones.

Israel - Military Use of Civilian Infrastructure

Designation: Israel accuses Hamas of using civilian areas for military purposes, citing 12,000 rockets and mortars fired from Gaza between 2000 and 2008, with 3,000 in 2008 alone. A 2009 government report to the UN documented rocket launch sites near schools and mosques, supported by video evidence. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center reported Hamas used nearly 100 mosques to store weapons and launch rockets, based on Palestinian testimony.

United Nations - Militant Activity in Civilian Zones

Designation: The 2009 UN Goldstone Report found credible evidence that Hamas militants blended with civilians during the Gaza conflict, though it found no intent to use civilians as shields. A specific case in January 2009 involved an Israeli mortar strike near a UN school, killing dozens, after Hamas fired a rocket from an adjacent yard.

Israel - 2006 Jabalya Incident

Designation: In November 2006, Israel accused Hamas of organizing civilians to protect a target in Jabalya refugee camp, suspending a planned airstrike after hundreds, mostly women and children, gathered at the site. Human Rights Watch initially condemned the action as unlawful but later clarified it was an administrative demolition, not a military operation.

Hamas - Child Involvement in Military Activities

Designation: Hamas has acknowledged training teenagers in weapons handling at summer camps, with evidence from 2001 showing kindergarten children in uniforms and mock rifles at ceremonies. After three teens died in a 2002 attack on Netzarim, Hamas banned child attacks and urged restraint. A 2012 report documented at least 160 child deaths during tunnel construction for attacks on Israel.

Children as combatants

See also: Children in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Child supporter of Hamas in December 2012

In the early intifada period, children in Gaza and the West Bank were instilled by Hamas with Islamic and military values. Evidence from 2001 shows that kindergarten children attended ceremonies where they wore emblematic uniforms and bore mock rifles. Some were dressed up as suicide bombers, whose readiness to die for the cause was held up as a model to be imitated. The preschoolers would swear an oath 'to pursue jihad, resistance and intifada.' At summer camps, alongside qur'anic studies and familiarization with computers, courses were given that included military training.

Although Hamas admits to sponsoring summer schools to train teenagers in handling weapons they condemn attacks by children. Following the deaths of three teenagers during a 2002 attack on Netzarim in central Gaza, Hamas banned attacks by children and "called on the teachers and religious leaders to spread the message of restraint among young boys". Hamas's use of child labor to build tunnels with which to attack Israel has also been criticized, with at least 160 children killed in the tunnels as of 2012.

Human Rights Watch – press restrictions

Designation: Human Rights Watch (HRW) has accused Hamas of restricting press freedom in Gaza, documenting harassment of journalists. In 2008, Hamas banned the pro-Fatah Al-Ayyam newspaper and closed its offices over a caricature mocking Hamas legislators.

Reporters Without Borders - journalist harassment

Designation: Reporters Without Borders criticized Hamas for disbanding the Gaza branch of the Palestinian Journalists’ Union in September 2007. In 2016, it reported Hamas tortured journalists to control media coverage.

International Federation of Journalists - union suppression

Designation: The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) accused Hamas of harassing Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate (PJS) officials in Gaza starting March 2012, including a raid on PJS offices with security force support. In November 2012, Hamas confiscated passports of two journalists, barring them from a Cairo conference.

Independent Commission for Human Rights - abuses in 2010

Designation: In June 2011, the Independent Commission for Human Rights in Ramallah reported that Hamas conducted widespread human rights abuses in Gaza in 2010, including torture and arbitrary detentions.

Human Rights Watch - Torture and Detentions

Designation: HRW’s 2012 report documented Hamas torturing 102 Palestinians, using beatings and hangings, targeting activists and protesters. It cited the captivity of Gilad Shalit from 2006 to 2011 as a notable violation.

Amnesty International - 2014 extrajudicial killings

Designation: Amnesty International reported in 2015 that Hamas executed at least 23 Palestinians and tortured dozens during the 2014 Gaza conflict, often targeting Fatah members, using Al-Shifa Hospital for detentions.

Fatah - 2019 Accusations

Designation: In 2019, Fatah spokesman Osama Qawassmeh accused Hamas of kidnapping and torturing 100 Fatah members in Gaza, including breaking the legs of activist Raed Abu al-Hassin after a pro-Abbas protest.

Public Perception

Palestinian Opinion

Designation: Before 2006, Hamas was viewed favorably by many Palestinians for its efficiency compared to Fatah. After taking Gaza in 2007, a 2014 Pew Research poll found 33% of Palestinians held positive views, with over 50% negative. Post-2014 Gaza conflict, an Al Jazeera poll reported 81% of Palestinians felt Hamas "won" the war. A June 2021 poll showed 53% of Palestinians favored Hamas over Fatah’s 14%.

Regional Opinion

Designation: A 2014 Pew poll found 65% of Lebanese, 60% of Jordanians and Egyptians, and 80% of Turks viewed Hamas negatively. In 2021, 46% of Saudis supported Hamas rocket attacks on Israel. A 2023 poll showed 60% of Jordanians viewed Hamas rocket attacks positively.

Lawsuits Against Hamas and Related Entities

See also: Anti-terrorism legislation

Below is a summary of significant legal actions involving Hamas, based on court filings, judgments, and official reports, emphasizing outcomes and allegations tied to its actions or support networks.

United States - Holy Land Foundation Case

Description: In 2001, the U.S. Justice Department accused the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, a Texas-based Muslim charity, of funneling money to Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. After a 2007 mistrial, a 2008 retrial convicted five leaders on 108 counts, including material support for terrorism, money laundering, and tax fraud. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the convictions in 2011, citing "voluminous evidence" of financial ties to Hamas. Sentences ranged from 15 to 65 years.

United States - Ungar Family Lawsuit

Description: In 2004, a U.S. federal court found Hamas liable for the 1996 murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar, American-Israeli citizens killed near Bet Shemesh, Israel, ordering Hamas to pay $116 million to their families. The Palestinian Authority settled the case in 2011 for an undisclosed amount.

United States - October 7, 2023 Attack Victims vs. Iran, Syria, and Binance

Description: On January 31, 2024, three American families affected by Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack sued Iran, Syria, and Binance in the Southern District of New York, alleging these entities provided financial and material support to Hamas. The suit claims Iran and Syria armed and funded Hamas, while Binance facilitated transactions, seeking unspecified damages. The case is ongoing as of March 12, 2025.

United States - October 7, 2023 Victims vs. AMP and NSJP

Description: On May 1, 2024, nine American and Israeli victims of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia against American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) and National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), alleging they acted as propagandists and collaborators for Hamas. The suit seeks compensatory damages, claiming AMP and NSJP provided "substantial assistance" to Hamas’s terrorism. The case remains active as of March 12, 2025.

United States - October 7, 2023 Victims vs. Iran, Syria, and North Korea

Description: On July 1, 2024, over 100 victims and relatives of the October 7, 2023 attack sued Iran, Syria, and North Korea in Washington, D.C. federal court, backed by the Anti-Defamation League, accusing them of providing financial, military, and tactical support to Hamas. The suit demands at least $4 billion in damages, targeting the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. It is ongoing as of March 12, 2025.

Germany - IHH e.V. Ban and Lawsuit

Description: In 2010, Germany outlawed the Frankfurt-based International Humanitarian Aid Organization (IHH e.V.), alleging it used donations to support Hamas-affiliated projects in Gaza. A 2004 German federal court had ruled Hamas’s humanitarian and terrorist activities were inseparable, supporting the ban. No further lawsuits followed, but the ban remains in effect.

Support

Public support

Prior to 2006, Hamas was well regarded by Palestinians for its efficiency and perceived lack of corruption compared to Fatah. Public opinions of Hamas have deteriorated after it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Prior to the takeover, 62% of Palestinians had held a favorable view of the group, while a third had negative views. According to a 2014 Pew Research just prior to the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, only about a third had positive opinions and more than half viewed Hamas negatively. Furthermore, 68% of Israeli Arabs viewed Hamas negatively.

In July 2014, 65% of Lebanese viewed Hamas negatively. In Jordan and Egypt, roughly 60% viewed Hamas negatively, and in Turkey, 80% had a negative view of Hamas. In Tunisia, 42% had a negative view of Hamas, while 56% of Bangladeshis and 44% of Indonesians had a negative opinion of Hamas.

Hamas popularity surged after the war in July-August 2014 with polls reporting that 81 percent of Palestinians felt that Hamas had "won" that war. A June 2021 poll found that 53% of Palestinians believed Hamas was "most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people", while only 14% preferred Abbas's Fatah party. A June 2021 opinion poll found that 46% of respondents in Saudi Arabia supported rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis. A March/April 2023 poll found that 60% of Jordanians viewed Hamas firing rockets at Israel at least somewhat positively.

Pro-Hamas rally in Damascus

International support

Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad. The movement is deliberately fragmented to ensure that Israel cannot kill its top political and military leaders. Hamas used to be strongly allied with both Iran and Syria. Iran gave Hamas an estimated $13–15 million in 2011 as well as access to long-range missiles. Hamas's political bureau was once located in the Syrian capital of Damascus before the start of the Syrian civil war. Relations between Hamas, Iran, and Syria began to turn cold when Hamas refused to back the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Instead, Hamas backed the Sunni rebels fighting against Assad. As a result, Iran cut funding to Hamas, and Iranian ally Hezbollah ordered Hamas members out of Lebanon. Hamas was then forced out of Syria. Since then, Hamas has tried to mend fences with Iran and Hezbollah. Hamas contacted Jordan and Sudan to see if either would open up its borders to its political bureau, but both countries refused, although they welcomed many Hamas members leaving Syria.

From 2012 to 2013, under the leadership of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, Hamas had the support of Egypt. However, when Morsi was removed from office, his replacement Abdul Fattah al-Sisi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the tunnels Hamas built into Egypt. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are likewise hostile to Hamas. Like Egypt, they designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and Hamas was viewed as its Palestinian equivalent.

Qatar and Turkey

See also: Qatar and state-sponsored terrorism and Turkey and state-sponsored terrorism

According to Middle East experts, now Hamas has two firm allies: Qatar and Turkey. Both give Hamas public and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Qatar has transferred more than $1.8 billion to Hamas. Shashank Joshi, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, says that "Qatar also hosts Hamas's political bureau which includes Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal." Meshaal also visits Turkey frequently to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdogan has dedicated himself to breaking Hamas out of its political and economic seclusion. On U.S. television, Erdogan said in 2012 that "I don't see Hamas as a terror organization. Hamas is a political party."

Qatar has been called Hamas' most important financial backer and foreign ally. In 2007, Qatar was, with Turkey, the only country to back Hamas after the group ousted the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip. The relationship between Hamas and Qatar strengthened in 2008 and 2009 when Khaled Meshaal was invited to attend the Doha Summit where he was seated next to the then Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who pledged $250 million to repair the damage caused by Israel in the Israeli war on Gaza. These events caused Qatar to become the main player in the "Palestinian issue". Qatar called Gaza's blockade unjust and immoral, which prompted the Hamas government in Gaza, including former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, to thank Qatar for their "unconditional" support. Qatar then began regularly handing out political, material, humanitarian and charitable support for Hamas.

In 2012, Qatar's former Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, became the first head of state to visit Gaza under Hamas rule. He pledged to raise $400 million for reconstruction. Sources say that advocating for Hamas is politically beneficial to Turkey and Qatar because the Palestinian cause draws popular support amongst their citizens at home.

Speaking in reference to Qatar's support for Hamas, during a 2015 visit to Palestine, Qatari official Mohammad al-Emadi, said Qatar is using the money not to help Hamas but rather the Palestinian people as a whole. He acknowledges however that giving to the Palestinian people means using Hamas as the local contact. Emadi said, "You have to support them. You don't like them, don't like them. But they control the country, you know." Some argue that Hamas's relations with Qatar are putting Hamas in an awkward position because Qatar has become part of the regional Arab problem. However, Hamas claims that having contacts with various Arab countries establishes positive relations which will encourage Arab countries to do their duty toward the Palestinians and support their cause by influencing public opinion in the Arab world. In March 2015, Hamas has announced its support of the Saudi Arabian-led military intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

In May 2018, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tweeted to the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a resistance movement that defends the Palestinian homeland against an occupying power. During that period there were conflicts between Israeli troops and Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip, due to the decision of the United States to move their embassy to Jerusalem. In addition, in 2018 the Israel Security Agency accused SADAT International Defense Consultancy (a private Turkish Private military company with connections to the Turkish government) of transferring funds to Hamas.

China

After the Hamas victory in 2006, China did not label it a "terrorist organization" and welcomed Hamas' foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, to Beijing for the China-Arab Cooperation Forum ignoring protests by both the United States and Israel but receiving praise from Mahmoud Abbas. China has harshly criticised Israel for its economic blockade of Gaza since 2007 when Hamas assumed control of the territory. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao stated, "We believe that the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected". In April 2011, a spokesman from China's foreign ministry embraced the Hamas-Fatah agreement to form an interim government.

In 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on Israel to lift its blockade and advised both Israel and Hamas to cease fighting. He reaffirmed support from China to the Palestinian people's right to establish an independent state. He told a joint press conference, "China will grant $1.5 million in emergency humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza."

In June 2018, China voted in support of a United Nations Security Council resolution vetoed by the US that criticized Israel of excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate force by the Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians in Gaza during the 2018 Gaza border protests. Later the same day, China abstained from voting on a US drafted resolution that blamed Hamas for the escalated violence.

See also

• 25th anniversary of Hamas
• Hamastan
• Human rights in the Palestinian National Authority
• List of political parties in the Palestinian National Authority

Notes and references

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• Jad, Islah (2018). Palestinian Women's Activism: Nationalism, Secularism, Islamism. Syracuse University Press. pp. 132–. ISBN 978-0815654599.
• Jamal, Ama (2005). The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967–2005. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0253217738.
• Jefferis, Jennifer (2016). Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and Its Future in Middle East Politics. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1440839030.
• Kabahā, Muṣṭafá (2014). The Palestinian People: Seeking Sovereignty and State. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. ISBN 978-1588268822.
• Kass, Ilana; O'Neill, Bard E. (1997). The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process. University Press of America/National Institute for Public Policy. ISBN 978-0761805359.
• Katz, Samuel M. (2002). The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber. Lyons Press. ISBN 978-1585747498.
• Kear, Martin (2018). Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood. Routledge. ISBN 978-0429999406.
• Kimmerling, Baruch (2009). The Palestinian People: A History. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674039599.
• Levitt, Matthew (2006). Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300122589.
• Levitt, Matthew (2008). Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0742565661.
• Lindholm Schulz, Helena (1999). The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0719055966.
• Litvak, Meir (2004). "Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism:Hamas". In Hughes, Matthew; Johnson, Gaynor (eds.). Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age. Frank Cass. pp. 156–72. ISBN 978-1135753641.
• Litvak, Meir (2008). "Hamas: Palestinian Identity, Islam, and National Sovereignty". In Susser, Asher (ed.). Challenges to the Cohesion of the Arabic State. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. ISBN 978-9652240798.
• Johnson, Loch K. (2007). Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 2–. ISBN 978-0313065286.
• Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (2002). Middle East Contemporary Survey: Vol. XXIII 1999. The Moshe Dayan Center. pp. 352–. ISBN 978-9652240491.
• Mannes, Aaron (2004). Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 114–. ISBN 978-0742535251.
• Martin, Gus (2009). Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (3rd, illustrated ed.). Sage. ISBN 978-1412970594. Retrieved 18 March 2016.
• Martin, Gus (2011). The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism (2nd ed.). Sage. pp. 81–. ISBN 978-1412980166.
• Mattar, Philip (2005). Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. Infobase Publishing. pp. 195–. ISBN 978-0816069866.
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley; Farrell, Stephen (2013). Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0745654683.
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2015). The Muslim Brotherhood: The Arab Spring and its future face. Routledge. ISBN 978-1317333654.
• Mishal, S.; Sela, A. (2006). The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0231140072.
• Mukhimer, Tariq (2012). Hamas Rule in Gaza: Human Rights Under Constraint. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1137310194.
• Müller, Sebastian R. (2012). Hawala: An Informal Payment System and Its Use to Finance Terrorism. AV Akademikerverlag. ISBN 978-3639444186.
• Najib, Mohammad; Friedrich, Roland (2007). "Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance". In Friedrich, Roland; Luethold, Arnold (eds.). Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform. DCAF. pp. 101–127. ISBN 978-9292220617.
• Neack, Laura (2008). The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 101–. ISBN 978-0742556317.
• O'Malley, Padraig (2015). The Two-State Delusion: Israel and Palestine – A Tale of Two Narratives. Penguin Publishing Group. pp. 126–. ISBN 978-0698192188.
• Penn, Michael (2014). Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japanese Alliance. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0857724731.
• Perry, Mark (2014). "Gaza's Bottle Rockets". In Rose, Gideon (ed.). Clueless in Gaza. Foreign Affairs. p. 134. ISBN 978-0876096062.
• Phillips, David L. (2011). From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition. Transaction Publishers. pp. 81–. ISBN 978-1412812016.
• Reese, Erlich; Baer, Robert (2016). Conversations with Terrorists: Middle East Leaders on Politics, Violence, and Empire. Routledge. ISBN 978-1317261988.
• Robinson, Glenn E. (2004). "Hamas as a Social Movement". In Wiktorowicz, Quintan (ed.). Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press. pp. 112–39. ISBN 978-0253216212.
• Roy, Sara (2013). Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (2 ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691124483.
• Rubin, Barry (June 2009). The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building. Harvard University Press. pp. 133–. ISBN 978-0674042957.
• Rubenberg, Cheryl (2001). Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1555879563.
• Sabry, Mohannad (2015). Sinai: Egypt's Linchpin, Gaza's Lifeline, Israel's Nightmare. American University in Cairo Press. ISBN 978-9774167287.
• Schanzer, Jonathan (2008). Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. St. Martin's Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0230616455.
• Shitrit, Lihi Ben (2015). Righteous Transgressions: Women's Activism on the Israeli and Palestinian Religious Right. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1400873845.
• Sinai, Joshua (2019). "Israel and terrorism: assessing the effectiveness of Netanyahu's "combating terrorism strategy" (CTS)". In Freeman, Robert O. (ed.). Israel Under Netanyahu: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. Routledge. pp. 273–90. ISBN 978-1000751765.
• Singh, Rashmi (2013). Hamas and Suicide Terrorism: Multi-causal and Multi-level Approaches. Routledge. ISBN 978-1135695996.
• Slater, Jerome (2020). Mythologies Without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917–2020. Oxford University Press. pp. 280–. ISBN 978-0190459086.
• Stepanova, Ekaterina (2008). Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (PDF). SIPRI / Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199533558. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 10, 2016. Retrieved May 5, 2015.
• Stork, Joe; Kane, Kristen (2002). Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians. Human Rights Watch. pp. 66–. ISBN 978-1564322807.
• Swedenburg, Ted (2003). Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past. University of Arkansas Press. pp. 196–. ISBN 978-1610752633.
• Tucker, Spencer C. (2019). Middle East Conflicts from Ancient Egypt to the 21st Century: An Encyclopedia and Document Collection [4 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. pp. 808–. ISBN 978-1440853531.
• Van Engeland, Alincée (2015). "Hamas". In Ross, Jeffrey Ian (ed.). Religion and Violence: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict from Antiquity to the Present. Routledge. pp. 319–23. ISBN 978-1317461098.
• Van Esveld, Bill (6 August 2009). "Rockets from Gaza: Harm to Civilians from Palestinian Armed Groups' Rocket Attacks". Human Rights Watch.
• Vittori, Jodi (2011). Terrorist Financing and Resourcing. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0230117716.
• Yousef, M.H. (2010). Son of Hamas. Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House. p. 288. ISBN 978-1414333076.
• The World Almanac of Islamism: 2014. American Foreign Policy Council / Rowman & Littlefield. 2014. p. 15. ISBN 978-1442231443.

Journal articles

• Abu-Amr, Ziad (Summer 1993). "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background". Journal of Palestine Studies. 22 (4): 5–19. doi:10.2307/2538077. JSTOR 2538077.
• Benmelech, Efraim; Berrebi, Claude (July 1, 2007). "Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers". Journal of Economic Perspectives. American Economic Association. 21 (3): 223–38. doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.223. ISSN 0895-3309.
• Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (June 1, 2006). "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada". Social Forces. Oxford University Press. 84 (4): 1969–86. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585.
• Byman, Daniel (September–October 2010). "How to Handle Hamas: The Perils of Ignoring Gaza's Leadership". Foreign Affairs. 89 (5): 45–62. JSTOR 20788644.
• Clauset, Aaron; Heger, Lindsay; Young, Maxwell; Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (March 2010). "The strategic calculus of terrorism: Substitution and competition in the Israel-Palestine conflict". Cooperation and Conflict. 45 (1): 6–33. doi:10.1177/0010836709347113. JSTOR 45084592. S2CID 2091170.
• Gunning, Jeroen (March 2004). "Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation". International Affairs. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 80 (2): 233–55. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00381.x. JSTOR 3569240.
• Herzog, Michael (March–April 2006). "Can Hamas Be Tamed?". Foreign Affairs. 85 (2): 83–94. doi:10.2307/20031913. JSTOR 20031913.
• Hroub, Khaled (Summer 2006b). "A 'New Hamas' through Its New Documents". Journal of Palestine Studies. 35 (4): 6–27. doi:10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6. JSTOR 10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6.
• Klein, Menachem (Summer 2007). "Hamas in Power". Middle East Journal. 61 (3): 442–59. doi:10.3751/61.3.13. JSTOR 4330419.
• Litvak, Meir (January 1998). "The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas". Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (1): 148–63. doi:10.1080/00263209808701214. JSTOR 4283922.
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2008). "The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and Consolidation in the Gaza Strip". Third World Quarterly. 29 (8): 1585–99. doi:10.1080/01436590802528739. JSTOR 20455131. S2CID 154386730.
• Mishal, Shaul (July 2003). "The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective". Armed Forces & Society. 29 (4): 569–89. doi:10.1177/0095327X0302900406. S2CID 145575473.
• Pape, Robert A. (August 27, 2003). "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 97 (3): 343–61. doi:10.1017/S000305540300073X. hdl:1811/31746. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 1019730. Retrieved October 27, 2020.
• Pressman, Jeremy (February 21, 2006). "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". Journal of Conflict Studies. 23 (2). ISSN 1715-5673. Retrieved October 29, 2020.
• Tocci, Nathalie (Winter 2013). "The EU and the Middle East Quartet: A case of (in)effective multilateralism". Middle East Journal. 67 (1): 29–44. doi:10.3751/67.1.12. JSTOR 23361691. S2CID 144645884.
• Roy, Sara (Summer 1993). "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration". Journal of Palestine Studies. 22 (4): 20–31. doi:10.2307/2538078. JSTOR 2538078.
• Zweiri, Mahjoob (2006). "The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Major Earthquake?". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 675–87. doi:10.1080/01436590600720876. JSTOR 4017731. S2CID 153346639.
• Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2012). "The Origins of Hamas: Militant Legacy or Israeli Tool?". Journal of Palestine Studies. 41 (3): 54–70. doi:10.1525/jps.2012.XLI.3.54.
• Chen, Tianshe (July 17, 2018) [Offline published in 2010]. "Support or Hostility: the Relationship between Arab Countries and Hamas". Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (In Asia). 4 (2): 100–20. doi:10.1080/19370679.2010.12023158.

Other

• "Youths' Suicide Mission Stuns Palestinians". ABC News. 25 April 2002.
• "Hamas West Bank leader given six-month detention without trial". Arab News. Agence France-Presse. 8 April 2019.
• Amayreh, Khaled (29 January – 4 February 2004). "Running out of time". Al-Ahram. No. 675. Archived from the original on January 20, 2010.
• Assi, Seraj (16 December 2018). "Hamas Owes Its 'Palestine From the River to the Sea' Slogan to Zionism". Haaretz.
• Barzak, Ibrahim (11 June 2011). "Muhammad Hassan Shama, little-known Hamas founder". Boston Globe.
• "UN General Assembly rejects US resolution to condemn Hamas". Deutsche Welle. 7 December 2018.
• "Hamas: The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization". CRS Issue Brief. October 14, 1993. Archived from the original on January 6, 2006.
• Dalloul, Motasem A (14 December 2017). "Interview with Dr Ibrahim Al-Yazouri, a founder of Hamas". Middle East Monitor.
• "Blowback: How Israel Went From Helping Create Hamas to Bombing It". The Intercept. February 19, 2018. Retrieved October 27, 2020.
• Higgins, Andrew (January 24, 2009). "How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas". WSJ. Archived from the original on September 26, 2009. Retrieved October 27, 2020.
• Hirst, David (November 22, 1999). "Jordan curbs Hamas". The Guardian. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
• Platt, Edward (August 30, 2010). "For Arabs in Israel, a house is not a home". New Statesman. Retrieved October 27, 2020.
• Rose, David (March 5, 2008). "The Proof Is in the Paper Trail". Vanity Fair. Retrieved August 1, 2011.

External links

• Official website (in English)
• Hamas leaders CFR
• Hamas Charter
• The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) (includes interpretation)
• Hamas Shifts From Rockets to Public Relations The New York Times, July 23, 2009
• 22 years on the start of Hamas Al-Qassam Brigades' Information Office
• Fatah and Hamas Human Rights Violations in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in 2007 by Elizabeth Freed of Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group
• Sherifa Zuhur, Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics (PDF file) December 2008
• "Hamas threatens attacks on US: Terrorist warns 'Middle East is full of American targets'" Ynet News. December 24, 2006. Accessed July 20, 2014.