Bug–Narew Offensive

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Bug-Narew Offensive
Part of the Eastern Front of World War I
EasternFront1915b.jpg
Bug-Narew Offensive
and Russian withdrawal
Date13 July – 27 August 1915
Location
Bug and Narew area, (present-day Poland)
Result

German victory

Belligerents
 German Empire  Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
German Empire Paul von Hindenburg
German Empire Erich Ludendorff
German Empire Max Hoffmann
German Empire Hermann von Eichhorn
German Empire Max von Gallwitz
German Empire Friedrich von Scholtz		 Russian Empire Mikhail Alekseyev
Russian Empire Alexander Litvinov
Units involved
German Empire XII Army
German Empire VIII Army
German Empire IX Army
 Russian Empire I Army
Russian Empire XII Army
Russian Empire II Army
Strength
On 13.07.1915
Total: 536,006 men[1]
Armee-Gruppe Gallwitz (later 12th Army):
281,784 men
822 guns
8th Army:
110,500 men
9th Army:
143,722 men		 On 13.07.1915
Total: 763,118 men[2]
1st Army:
378,095 men
12th Army:
212,082 men
1st+12th Army:
767 machine guns
1,068 guns
2nd Army:
172,941 men
187 machine guns
322 guns
Casualties and losses
Total 104,398 men[3]
24,726 KIA
75,181 WIA
4,491 MIA		 Total 435,656 men:[4]
37,987 KIA
163,606 WIA
233,619 MIA

The Bug-Narew Offensive from July 13 to August 27, 1915 was a major German victory during World War I on the Eastern Front. The German army broke through 4 heavily fortified positions, inflicted defeats on superior enemy forces and pushed the Russian Army 300 km to the east, capturing 215,000 prisoners.[5][6] But the German army also suffered relatively heavy casualties, about 30,000 killed and missing.

Background

The victories won by the armies of the Central Powers in Galicia by the end of May 1915 prompted consideration of the development of success along the entire Eastern Front. On May 28, the Chief of German Great General Staff, General of Infantry Erich von Falkenhayn, defined the tasks of the German army of the Eastern Front in continuing the offensive as holding Libava for the longest possible time, capturing Warsaw with the help of chemical weapons, and facilitating the operation in Galicia by attracting Russian forces. At the same time, the front on the Narew was no longer given much importance. The chief of staff of the Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East, Lieutenant-General Erich Ludendorff, agreed only to conduct a new offensive on the Pilica River, transferring 4 divisions from Narew River to this sector. The Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, was against any weakening along the entire front. On June 2, Falkenhayn reported that the resistance of the Russian troops in Galicia had weakened, and there was no longer a need for a strike on Pilica river.[7]

The question of the transition of the German Eastern Front to active operations was again discussed at the highest level on June 3–4 and 11. E. von Falkenhayn this time put forward the idea of ​​an offensive north of the Neman, using forces from the 9th Army, whose front near Warsaw was quite reliable. On June 20, P. von Hindenburg agreed to a plan to resume the offensive against Mitava and Kovno, using reserves from the 8th Army and the army group of Max von Gallwitz, but subject to the simultaneous offensive of August von Mackensen's army group from the Vistula to the Bug and fleet operations against Riga.[8]

On June 28, two proposals were received at the Hindenburg headquarters in Lötzen: this time E. von Falkenhayn conveyed the wish of Emperor Wilhelm II that the attack against Kovno serve as a cover for crossing the Vistula at the mouth of the Pilica, and artillery general M. von Gallwitz proposed to strike at Przasnysz and Ciechanów. Hindenburg rejected both the Gallwitz plan, as directed against the heavily fortified part of the Russian front and Novogeorgievsk, and the idea of breaking through the 9th Army through several Russian defense lines. He, together with E. Ludendorff, proposed either to further strengthen the Mackensen's Army Group and refrain from attacking the armies of the Eastern Front, or to strike at the front of Kovno, Grodno.[9]

On June 30, Falkenhain and the chiefs of staff of the armies of the Eastern Front arrived in Lötzen to discuss this project. Ludendorff now insisted on an offensive along the Neman against Kovno, he was supported by Falkenhayn, who demanded to speed up the preparation of the operation. The chief of staff of the 8th Army, Colonel D. von Schwerin, who proved the unprofitability of the attack on Osowiec Fortress and offered to shift the blow to Lomzha and to the west, was not listened to. Also, Lieutenant Colonel G. Markvard, Chief of Staff of the Army Group Gallwitz, did not receive an answer about the plan to attack Przasnysz.[10]

However, E. von Falkenhayn, after visiting A. von Mackensen in Rava-Ruska and Archduke Friedrich in Pless, on July 2 conferred with Wilhelm II in Posen. The result was a directive dated 2 July (Signed by the Kaiser on July 3, but sent to headquarters the day before): “In addition to the great success in Galicia and the temporary improvement in the situation of Mackensen's troops. it is necessary to continue the offensive against Russia, limited in time and space of targets, so that the Supreme High Command at any time, in case of need, can quickly transfer large forces to another front. It is necessary to complete the operation in the East in 2 months. For this, a great military victory is needed through the close interaction of the Mackensen and Hindenburg army groups between the Bug, the Vistula and the Narew.[11]

The decision was influenced by the position of the chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command, Infantry General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. On June 28, he shared with E. von Falkenhayn the idea to surround the Russian armies west of the Bug with a strike on Siedlce from the north and a broad offensive from the Vistula to the Bug from the south - along a 650-km arc. On July 1, the "Directives for the development of operations" were discussed by the commander-in-chief, Archduke Friedrich, Duke of Teschen, with Falkenhayn, and on July 2 - with Emperor Wilhelm II and received his approval.[12]

On July 3, Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East, P. von Hindenburg ordered: the army of Remus von Woyrsch - to cover the operations of the Army Group Mackensen from Ivangorod and the mouth of the Pilica (river) and pursue the Russians in case of their retreat; 9th Army - to defend the left bank of the Vistula and advance along with the Woyrsch army through Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk if the Russians retreat; the army group of M. von Gallwitz to deliver the main blow to the Russian 1st Army and, after the breakthrough, go to Novogeorgievsk and the mouth of the Szkwa River, bearing in mind the exit to Siedlce; 8th Army - to assist the offensive of the Gallwitz group and join it; 10th Army - to cover the sector from Raygrod to the Neman River west of Kovno; Neman army - attack the Russian 5th army to facilitate the task of the 10th army. M. von Gallwitz was informed the day before by E. Ludendorff and the Quartermaster General of Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East, Lieutenant Colonel M. Hoffman, about the adoption of his project, about the intended goal of the offensive (offensive to Siedlce, that is, a breakthrough to a depth of 140 km, was replaced by a transition Narew from Pultusk to Różan and Ostrolenka).[13][14]

Comparison of strength

By July 5, the development of the "Haymaking" operation was completed at the headquarters of M. von Gallwitz. The main blow to the west of Przasnysz was delivered by the 17th reserve, 11th and 17th army corps, to the east of Przasnysz the 13th and 1st army corps advanced. Artillery support was provided by 71 batteries of field guns, 39 batteries of light howitzers, 38 batteries of heavy howitzers, 6 batteries of 21 cm mortars, 5 batteries of 10 cm heavy guns, a battery of 15 cm naval guns (822 guns in total) and 56 mortars. There were 281,784 men. The German 8th Army, which contributed to the offensive on the Narew (commanded by artillery general Friedrich von Scholtz), had 110,500 men in service and occupied positions from the Orzyc River to the Bobr River; it was less abundantly supplied with heavy artillery and shells.[15]

Russian fortified positions consisted of four defensive lines, resting against the fortresses of Novogeorgievsk , Pultusk , Różan , Ostrolenka , Łomża , Osowiec. The 1st Army of Cavalry General A. Litvinov defended the front from the banks of the Vistula northeast of the mouth of the Narew to the Omulew River. From the Omulew River to the Bobr River, the 12th Army of Infantry General A. Churin defended. In the 1st Army there were 378,095 men, in the 12th Army - 212,082 men. The defense of this sector of the front had to be reliable: the Russian troops had a significant superiority in manpower, both armies had 767 machine guns and 2,328 guns, but more than half of the artillery was in the fortresses of Novogeorgievsk (1,164) and Osowiec (96).[16]

The defense of the Vistula from the Narew River to the mouth of the Pilica River, including Warsaw, was entrusted to the 2nd Army of Infantry General V. Smirnov, numbering 172,941 men with 187 machine guns and 322 guns. There were 3,222 men and 66 guns in the Warsaw Alexander Citadel. Opposing these forces, the German 9th Army, Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria, gradually turned into a source of replenishment for strike groups. 143,722 men remained in it.[17]

First phase of the German offensive: Russian defense breakthrough and the Second battle of Przasnysz

On the night of July 13, the German troops of the army group M. von Gallwitz approached the Russian positions at a distance of 1 km. The Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East, Field Marshal P. von Hindenburg, arrived in Willenberg, at the headquarters of the army group' Max von Gallwitz. Against the section from Grudusk to Stegna, the German army concentrated the 13th, 17th and 11th Army corps; each of the divisions had two regiments in first line and a regiment in reserve. Against them were the positions of the Russian 1st, 2nd and 11th Siberian Rifle Divisions. Having no advantage in forces along the entire front, Gallwitz created a double superiority in numbers in the shock sector. Early in the morning (at 4.45) artillery preparation was started, but due to heavy rain the attack was delayed until 9-10 o'clock, artillery fire was moved deep into the Russian positions, the attacking infantry was accompanied by groups of sappers.

The commander of the Russian 1st Army, Cavalry General Alexander Litvinov, sent the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Brigade and the 14th Cavalry Division to the site of fierce fighting. The Chief of the staff of North-Western Front, Mikhail Alekseyev, ordered the transfer his reserve to the 1st Army: the 21st Army Corps and the 4th Army Corps from the 2nd Army.

By noon, German troops occupied Grudusk and captured the entire first Russian line, heavily destroyed by artillery, and most of the second line. The greatest success was achieved by the German 13th Army Corps, which forced the 2nd Siberian Rifle Division, despite the support of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Siberian Rifle Division, to retreat by night to a rear position from Krasnosielc to the village of Szczuki. The Germans advanced deep into the Russian positions to a depth of 3 to 10 km. During the day, 5,400 prisoners, 5 guns and 20 machine guns were captured. On the site of the 1st Turkestan Corps, the 1st and 2nd Turkestan rifle brigades were introduced into battle.[18]

At 10 o'clock on July 14, the German 36th Infantry Division passed Przasnysz; aerial reconnaissance reported the beginning of a mass withdrawal of Russian rears and convoys. By noon, the pursuing units of the 11th German Army Corps broke through the intermediate Russian positions, on the right flank of the Gallwitz army group, the Russians also began to withdraw.

By evening, the 4th Russian defensive line was broken through. The 17th reserve corps, which joined the offensive, went to Ciechanów and began to approach Novogeorgievsk. However, in general, rainy weather did not allow the German army to organize a quick pursuit and bring up heavy artillery in a timely manner. The commander of the North-Western Front, M. Alekseyev, arrived at Litvinov’s headquarters; the 30th and 40th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Brigade began to arrive and pour into combat areas.

On July 15, the German troops continued the onslaught on parts of the 1st Russian Army, but were not able to move forward in all sectors. The 13th Army Corps unsuccessfully attacked the well-fortified positions of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, reinforced by the 30th Infantry Division. Only some success of the neighboring 1st Army Corps forced M. Alekseyev, in order to avoid envelopment, to allow the withdrawal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps and the right flank of the 2nd Siberian Rifle Division.[19]

The German 17th Army Corps conducted stubborn attacks all day long at the junction of the 30th Infantry and 11th Siberian Rifle Divisions, captured Hill 124 near Dziki Bór. After the breakthrough of the units of the 1st Guards Reserve Division, the Russian 14th Cavalry Division was thrown into battle both on horseback and on foot: its counterattack was repulsed, but the advance of the Germans was stopped. The 11th German army corps, having introduced a fresh 50th reserve division into battle, was able to push back two Russian Turkestan rifle brigades and the German reserve division T. von Wernitz captured the redoubts at Długołęka. The resumption of the offensive from 19:00 and the introduction of the 14th Landwehr Division into battle led to the coverage of the Russian 1st Turkestan Army Corps and its retreat. However, it was not possible to break a gap in the orders of the Russian 1st Army, since the gaps were filled in time with the reinforcements brought in.[20]

By the night of July 16, at the headquarters of the army group of M. von Gallwitz, the development of an operation against the Russian fortress of Novogeorgievsk and to force the Narew River began. However, the slowdown of the offensive on the left flank caused the intervention of the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East, Lieutenant-General E. Ludendorff: instead of a barrier at Ostrołęka, he demanded to attack the fortress. Gallwitz believed that this direction should be transferred to the 8th Army, and directed the offensive of the corps to Pultusk and Różan.[21]

A. Litvinov, having received the necessary reinforcements, ordered from the night of July 16 the 1st Siberian and 1st Turkestan corps to go on the offensive and restore the previous situation. But this order remained unfulfilled: already at 4 o'clock the Germans resumed artillery preparation, which soon reached hurricane strength. At 6 o'clock, the division of Willem Clifford Cocq von Brougel broke into Ciechanów and, after a street battle, captured the city. The 17th reserve corps approached Nasielsk, creating a threat of a breakthrough east of Novogeorgievsk. The German 11th Army Corps advanced to the Gołymin-Ośrodek, and the 50th Reserve Division broke through the positions of the Russian 30th Infantry Division near Kurowo, throwing its scattered units back to the village Łukowo. The 2nd brigade of the 14th cavalry division, thrown into a counterattack on horseback, was almost completely destroyed by the concentrated small arms and machine-gun fire of the German 229th reserve infantry regiment; the commander of the 14th Hussar Mitavsky Regiment, Major General A. Westfalen, died, but the advance of the Germans was halted.[22]

The 1st and 2nd Siberian Rifle Divisions successfully repulsed the attacks of the 13th Army Corps, but the 17th Army Corps captured the redoubt at Bobowo and took up to 1,000 Russian prisoners. German troops broke into Gmina Krasnosielc , repulsed by a counterattack of the 10th Siberian Rifle Division. After the retreat under the onslaught of the 8th German Army and the 1st Army Corps of the left flank of the Russian 12th Army, the German 13th Army Corps captured the crossings over the Orzyca, and A. Litvinov at 13 o'clock ordered the immediate retreat of the entire 1st Army. However, it was not possible to break away from the German army.

The withdrawal of Russian troops to new positions was completed on the morning of July 17. For 4 days of fighting, 88 officers and 17,544 soldiers fell into German captivity, 13 guns, 40 machine guns, 7 mortars were lost.[23][24]

On July 17, A. Litvinov reinforced the right flank of the army with the 21st Army Corps transferred to him by M. Alekseyev, and concentrated the 1st Cavalry Corps behind the center. The headquarters of the North-Western Front was against sending the 27th Army Corps to Novogeorgievsk and declared it a reserve; instead, the 63rd Infantry Division from the 3rd Army was sent to the fortress. From the 2nd Army, the 1st Rifle Brigade was sent to Wyszków. The defense in front of Narew River was significantly strengthened, but time was needed for the arrival of all troops.

The intervention of the P. von Hindenburg, in the operational plan of M. von Gallwitz led to a change in the direction of the blow: it was shifted to the east, towards Ostrołęka. As a result, the 13th, 17th and 11th German army corps advanced against the reinforced 1st Siberian Army Corps (in the afternoon a section of the 4th Army Corps was allocated from it) from Kołaki to Tarnowo. To provide assistance, the commander of the 12th Army, A. Churin, sent the 1st Cavalry Brigade to the Siberians. During the day, reinforced by the incoming 33rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Siberian Rifle Division staunchly defended the position, the 14th Cavalry Division took advantage of the slow passage of the Germans through Orzhits to strengthen the trenches, but the 30th Infantry and 1st Siberian Rifle Divisions were again shot down from positions and retreated.[25]

At 13 o'clock Litvinov ordered to retreat beyond the Narew, but after 15 minutes canceled the order, as the 44th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Corps were approaching the front. However, after 15 hours, the Germans broke through to the rear of the 1st Siberian division, knocked down the 14th cavalry and 30th infantry divisions of the 4th army corps from their positions and pressed the 1st Turkestan corps. After an unsuccessful counterattack by the 40th Infantry Division, Litvinov at 18.30 again ordered the withdrawal of units of the 1st Siberian Corps across the Narew River.

During July 18, the group of M. von Gallwitz advanced after the retreating troops of the Russian 1st Army and reached the fortifications of Novogeorgievsk with the right wing, and the approaches to Ostrołęka with the left. In total, during the first phase of the Bug–Narew offensive, the Germans lost more than 20,000 men and captured 24,000 Russians as prisoners, 56 machine guns, 14 guns.[26] The total Russian losses exceeded 40,000 men. The goal of the next stage of the German offensive was to capture the course of the Narew River from Różan to Pultusk; at the same time, a corps was allocated to each of the fortresses, and the 17th army corps had to cross the river between these points. Strongly fortified positions at Różan and Pultusk, the presence of separate forts built before the war, included in a single defensive system, could not be broken through on the move. Gallwitz considered it necessary to reinforce the 13th Army Corps against Różan with at least one 30.5-cm gun, and sent two 42-cm mortars against Pultusk to the 11th Army Corps.

Second phase: Battle for initiative

On July 19, the Germans were preparing for the offensive. At the same time, it turned out that due to the delay of heavy artillery, not all corps were ready to launch an attack at the same time. Hindenburg and Ludendorff called for hastening preparations: at the same time, a demand was put forward for a tighter blockade of Novogeorgievsk. On the left flank, the 8th German Army reached the right bank of the Narew River at the mouth of the Rozoga River could act either by crossing the river or advancing on Ostrołęka.

The withdrawal of the 1st Army beyond the Narew also led to the withdrawal of the 2nd Army closer to Warsaw. The 12th Siberian Rifle and 68th Infantry Divisions were sent to Ostrołęka and Białystok from the 5th Army, which also fought heavy battles, and the 58th Infantry Division from the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front was additionally assigned to the Novogeorgievsk garrison.[27]

On the night of July 20, A. Litvinov, making sure that the Gallwitz army group was pursuing small forces, ordered from 10 o'clock in the morning to go on the offensive: the 1st Cavalry Corps on Dzbądz and Gnojno, going to the rear of the German group at the Różan's fortifications. 4th Army Corps on Maków, 21st Army Corps on Khrzanowo for joint operations with cavalry. The Germans by this time was already 400-800 steps from the Russian trenches.

The beginning of the Russian offensive coincided with the attacks of the 13th German Army Corps on the Różan's fortifications, where the Germans managed to capture Hill 132. In the sectors of the 1st Cavalry, 4th and 21st Army Corps, a stubborn battle went on all day. In the morning, the Russian troops managed to successfully cross the Narew and push back the German's barriers and vanguards, but from the middle of the day the Germans brought the main forces into battle and threw the Russians back behind the Narew. The village of Gnojno changed hands four times and was abandoned. At 21.15, on the orders chief of the staff M. Alekseyev, the offensive was stopped, the Russian corps returned to their original positions, retaining vanguards and patrols in the points still held behind Mariew (by order of Litvinov). At night, the Germans pushed back the 2nd brigade of the 33rd infantry division to Paulina. With great difficulty manage to stop the breakthrough with counterattacks. On the basis of the false testimony of the prisoner, A. Litvinov believed that the enemy had brought the entire 25th reserve corps into battle, and was preparing for new German attempts to cross the Narew River near Pultusk.[28]

During July 21, an attack group was assembled in the army group of M. von Gallwitz to attack Pultusk under the command of General of Infantry Otto von Plüskow. Transferring the 38th Infantry Division to the 17th Army Corps covering the operation, he received the 1st Guards and 50th Reserve and 85th Landwehr, 86th and 88th Infantry Divisions and the Pfeil brigade.[29]

On the night of July 23, German artillery opened heavy fire on Russian positions. At dawn, the German infantry went on the offensive. Two groups of the 11th Army Corps bypassed Pultusk, breaking through the positions of the 4th Army Corps in many places. The 17th Army Corps crossed the Narew River, the 1st Cavalry Corps could not hold back the onslaught of the Germans. At noon, A. Litvinov ordered the 1st Siberian Corps to deliver a “decisive and quick” blow to the enemy’s flank, and the 4th Army Corps and cavalry with the 1st Rifle Brigade to push back the Germans behind the Narew and restore the situation. But by 18 o'clock, the Russian troops were completely upset and broke through in many places, an 8-km gap formed between the 1st Turkestan and 4th army corps, and the commander of the 1st army asked the front headquarters for permission to withdraw troops behind the fort belt of Novogeorgievsk.[30]

By 19.30, the German breakthrough was closed by the introduction of the 11th Siberian Rifle Division into battle: A. Litvinov hoped to go on the counteroffensive after the arrival of the 27th Army Corps, but the situation turned out to be more difficult. The advantage of the Germans in artillery led to high losses. At 22:00 Litvinov ordered the 1st Army to retreat across the Narew River and destroy all bridges.

The 1st Army occupied a new defensive line without interference by 7 o'clock on July 24. The Germans entered Różan and Pultusk. But even in the new position, Litvinov did not hope to hold on, "since there are not enough cartridges and the line itself is not fortified, but on the right flank it is inconvenient for defense." He asked M. Alekseyev to transfer the 78th Infantry Division to him to reinforce the 21st Army Corps.[31]

On July 24, an army group of infantry general X. von Beseler was detached from the army group of M. von Gallwitz to act against the fortress of Novogeorgievsk as part of the corps of Lieutenant General Gustaf von Dickhuth-Harrach, 89th Infantry, 14th and 85th Landwehr divisions, Colonel Pfeil's brigade, 169th Landwehr brigade and heavy artillery of all corps west of Pultusk.

The new task of Gallwitz was access to the lower reaches of the Bug River. During the day, German troops approached the positions of the 1st Russian Army. If the 21st Army Corps was able to repel the attacks, then the 1st Cavalry Corps, followed by the 27th and 4th Army Corps, retreated. The 1st Siberian Army Corps was sent to counteract, but the German offensive continued successfully.[32]

The chief of the staff of the North-Western Front, M. Alekseyev, taking into account the course of battles both in the 1st Army and in other sectors of the front, on July 24 sent a directive to the army on the general withdrawal of the 12th, 1st, 2nd and 4th armies to the line Łomża - Węgrów - Siedlce and the continuation of deterrence actions of the 3rd and 13th armies at the positions of Łęczna - Chełm - Vladimir-Volynsky , with a possible withdrawal of troops to Kovel. At the same time, the 2nd Army was supposed to move to the right bank of the Vistula River, holding the line of the outer Warsaw forts, and the 1st and 4th armies - to support it from the flanks, showing "full energy, outstanding firmness and stubbornness." So the actions of the 1st Army were tied to the Warsaw bridgehead, despite the growing threat of a German breakthrough to the middle reaches of the Bug River.[33]

On July 25, the 13th German Army Corps occupied the Różan barracks on the left bank of the Narew River and pressed the 44th and 33rd Infantry Divisions of the Russian 21st Army Corps near Konin.[34]

The commander of the 1st Army, Litvinov, ordered the troops to go on the offensive in the morning of July 26 and drive the Germans across the Narew River. Litvinov also asked A. Churin to help him with the active actions of the 12th Army and appealed to the corps commanders: “There is no doubt that the first resistance that the enemy will put up against our offensive will be very stubborn, the more skillful, swifter, more decisive and persistent the offensive should be”.[35]

On the morning of July 26, the corps of the 1st Army, which went on the offensive along the entire front, met stubborn resistance from the Germans. Attacks were met and fought off with dense artillery, machine-gun and small arms fire, settlements changed hands several times.[36]

Litvinov hoped to continue the offensive on July 27 and gave the corresponding order at 20.40: "The resistance of the Germans has not yet been broken, but can be broken by our stubborn and persistent efforts."[37]

However, on the night of July 27, German troops again broke through the positions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps and captured the right flank of the 1st Army. Litvinov ordered the 21st Army Corps to be withdrawn, and the gap to Żabin to be occupied by the 6th Cavalry Division, urgently called at 1.30 from the 1st Cavalry Corps. By morning, the front was also reinforced by three regiments of the 78th Infantry Division; there was no strength left to develop the offensive.[38]

Until the evening of July 27, the left flank of the 1st Army unsuccessfully attacked the German positions from the outer forts of Novogeorgievsk to Adamowo and Dąbrówka. At midnight, A. Litvinov again ordered to continue the offensive.

In the 12th Army, the left flank continued to retreat under pressure 1st German Army Corps. The 4th Siberian Corps was reinforced by the regiments of the 68th Infantry Division, but the Germans broke through the positions of the 5th Army Corps with the forces of the 37th Infantry Division. The commander of the 12th Army, A. Churin, asked the front headquarters to support him with reserves, since a breakthrough to Nowogródek was becoming more and more dangerous. M. von Gallwitz also sent the 54th Infantry Division, which had arrived from France, to Ostrołęka. But he considered it risky to transport the division across the Narew on improvised means, especially since the 1st Army Corps had already lost more than 3,000 men, and after the Russian artillery destroyed the pontoons, the supply of ammunition almost stopped.[39]

On July 28-29, the 1st and 12th Russian armies tried to push back the German regiments that had crossed over the Narew River, but everywhere they met stubborn opposition. Mutual attacks led to the depletion of the forces of the parties and a small advance (in the 4th Army Corps - by 400 steps).

Considering that the Russians had exhausted their forces in fruitless attacks, E. Ludendorff, set M. von Gallwitz the following task: to take the right and advance on Ostrow and Małkin, but at the same time not to storm the fortresses, covering the actions with the troops of the 8th army. On July 30, Gallwitz instructed the group of infantry general Johannes von Eben (2nd, 37th, 54th and 83rd infantry divisions) to defeat the 4th Siberian Corps and occupy Żabin, the 13th Army Corps to attack Strumiany, and the rest of the troops of the army group - go on the defensive.[40]

On the evening of July 28, the Chief of staff of the North-Western Front, M. Alekseyev, transferred the 21st Army Corps (33rd, 44th, 78th Infantry Divisions) to the 12th Army along with its combat sector, to the same regiments of the 59th Infantry Division were sent: in the 1st Army, from the evening of July 30, the 4th Army Corps (30th and 40th Infantry Divisions) was withdrawn to the reserve. In the 12th Army, Chief of Staff N. Sivers ordered the creation of small reserve detachments in each corps to repel enemy breakthroughs. In the two Russian armies there were 583,756 men against 335,696 men in the German 8th Army and the army group of Gallwitz. This advantage gave hope that the German offensive would be stopped.[41][42]

On July 30, there were no more serious battles on the front of the 1st Army. All the efforts of the army group of M. von Gallwitz were directed against the Russian 12th Army. The 4th Guards and 54th Infantry Divisions broke through the location of the 4th Siberian Army Corps in the afternoon and occupied Goworówek and Żabin by evening. A. Churin sent the 68th Infantry and 6th Cavalry Divisions (from the 1st Army) to the breakthrough site, but they only temporarily managed to stop the advance of the Germans.

On July 31, M. von Gallwitz, having learned that on the bridgehead beyond the Narew River near Kamionka for the fifth day blocked 6 battalions of the 37th Infantry Division, sent heavy artillery to it and resumed attacks by the forces of the 1st and 13th Army Corps. The offensive was met with attacks from the Russian 59th Infantry Division, and the fighting for Hill 111 continued until evening. The troops of the 4th Siberian and 21st Army Corps were driven back, but escaped envelopment. New positions were occupied from Brzeźno to Ostrołęka. Only the German 83rd Infantry Division lost 84 officers and 3,100 soldiers in battle. The losses of the Russian side were also great. Since the beginning of the operation, 161 officers and 44,926 soldiers have been captured, 14 guns, 133 machine guns, and 6 mortars have been lost.[43]

M. von Gallwitz pulled the 50th reserve division to the right flank, transferring the 85th landwehr division to the army group X. von Beseler to blockade the Novogeorgievsk fortress from the northeast, and sent the 1st and 13th army corps to the east of border Rozan, Ostrołęka. In the battles of August 1-2, German troops managed to capture the village Grabowo and the heights near the village of Borawe with heavy losses, constantly repelling counterattacks of the 4th Siberian, 5th and 21st Army Corps. The German 8th Army pushed back the 1st Army Corps of the 12th Army at Kupnino and Serwatki. By August 3, due to heavy losses, the 1st Army Corps and the 4th Siberian Corps were withdrawn.[44]

14 July – 31 July 1915 KIA WIA MIA TOTAL
Russians Ratio Germans Russians Ratio Germans Russians Ratio Germans Russians Ratio Germans
Combat casualties[45] 20,948 2.8:1 7460 34,678 1:1,05 36,451 71,112 36.6:1 1.943 133,069 2,2:1 60,482

Third phase: general retreat of the Russian army

Russian troops retained a numerical advantage over the Germans, the supply of shells made it possible to conduct an intense battle for several days. However, the German and Austro-Hungarian troops of the army of Remus von Woyrsch managed to force the Vistula River above Ivangorod and create a threat to the rear of the Ivangorod fortress and the 2nd Russian army.

On August 2, M. Alekseyev gave the order to stubbornly defend the line of Warsaw forts and Praga (a suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula River), but in the evening he ordered to withdraw the 2nd Army on the night of August 3 to the right bank of the Vistula, retaining only the line of forts, but not waging a stubborn battle on it, but only, if possible, delaying the Germans.

As a result, both the 1st and 12th Russian armies had to take measures for the timely withdrawal of units so as not to be cut off by the breakthrough of the armies of the Central Powers from the south. The garrison of the Novogeorgievsk fortress, now subordinate directly to M. Alekseyev; On August 3, it began to be withdrawn from advanced positions to the forts of the outer bypass. Covering the withdrawal of the 2nd, 4th and 3rd armies was assigned to the 1st and 12th armies.

In the 12th Army on August 3, a stubborn battle continued along the entire front, while the 4th Siberian Corps was again thrown back. German troops captured 2,000 prisoners and 14 machine guns.

But on August 4, after 14 hours, the Germans attacked with large forces and broke through the positions of the 1st Siberian Army Corps and threw back the left flank of the 21st Army Corps of the 12th Army. The losses suffered were so great that at midnight on August 5, the commander of the 1st Army ordered the right flank of the army to be withdrawn with the withdrawal of the 4th Army Corps to the army reserve. During the day the German onslaught continued. Actions in the sector of the 12th Army were also fierce. On August 4-5, Russian troops stubbornly defended their positions along the Orzyc river, constantly conducting counterattacks, but by the evening they were pushed back.

On the night of August 5, Russian troops of the 2nd Army left Warsaw, blowing up railway stations and bridges across the Vistula River. In the morning, the troops of the 9th German Army, led by Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria, entered the capital of the Kingdom of Poland.

On August 6, the army group of M. von Gallwitz was transformed into the 12th army. To strengthen the offensive on the left flank of the army, the 11th Army Corps was transferred. In three days, Russian troops were driven back at a front of 25 km to 4-7 km to the east, they lost 85 officers and 14,200 soldiers as prisoners, 6 guns, 8 mortars, 69 machine guns.

On August 7, the 1st Army Corps of the 12th Army was again attacked and left the northern part of Szczepankowo. Following the 12th Army, under pressure from the Germans (13th and 17th Army Corps), the right flank of the 1st Army began to retreat.

By the morning of August 8, the 1st Army also made a withdrawal. As a result of the retreat of the 1st and 2nd armies, the Novogeorgievsk fortress was blocked from the south by the division of Lieutenant General Thilo von Westernhagen from the German 9th Army. Ludendorff sent von Galwitz an order for a “parallel pursuit” of Russian troops along the Bug River in order to intercept their retreat to the east. The capture of Novogeorgievsk was entrusted to the siege corps of Hans Hartwig von Beseler, while Ludendorff insisted on attacking the fortress from the east, from the confluence of the Bug and Vistula, while Gallwitz considered it more convenient to attack from the north, where there were no water barriers.

Having discovered the withdrawal of Russian troops, the German 12th Army, on the morning of August 8, turned to pursuit. Pressure continued on the left flank of the Russian 12th Army. The heavy losses of the Russian 12th Army (up to 80,000 men, of which 30,000 were killed and captured) forced its commander to decide to withdraw, despite the objections the chief of the staff of the North-Western Front. The 33rd and 78th divisions were completely destroyed, only 380 men remained in the brigade of the 44th division.

The situation with ammunition became more complicated: 140 shells remained for a light gun, 101 - for a corps mortar, 56 - for a heavy howitzer, and 86 - for a heavy gun. Only 4,100 shells for field and 652 for heavy guns remained in the 12th Army.

The situation was complicated by the offensive of the 9th German Army, which crossed from Warsaw to the right bank of the Vistula River.

By the evening of August 10, the Russian 1st and 12th armies retreated to new positions, the Germans completely captured the Łomża fortress, and entrenched themselves on the banks of the Bug River. But the onslaught on the junction of the Russian armies continued.

On the night of August 11, the 12th Army retreated from the bend of the Narew River. Von Gallwitz was preparing to continue pushing through the junction of the Russian armies, but E. Ludendorff categorically ordered the direction of the attack to be shifted to the right flank - along the right bank of the Bug River.

On August 11, the 17th and 13th German army corps pushed back parts of the 1st Siberian and 21st army corps beyond Zuzel and towards Czyżew. The 11th and 1st Army Corps again defeated the 4th Siberian and 5th Army Corps.

The 8th and 12th German armies received a new task: to advance on Bielsk Podlaski.

On August 12, the German 8th Army attacked the positions of the 1st Army Corps of the Russian 12th Army, the German 75th reserve division advanced 20 km at once. The 4th Siberian Army Corps, reinforced by the new 61st Division, offered stubborn resistance to the 1st German Army Corps, but the left flank of the corps was pushed back 7 km.

The position of the Russian armies was threatening, on the night of August 13, the Russian armies continued to withdraw, but he was quickly discovered by the enemy. Already at 3 o'clock the Germans began the pursuit, introducing the 86th Infantry Division into battle again. The Germans advanced 18-20 km to the east until evening, and the 1st Army Corps - up to 25 km. The 1st and 2nd armies retreated towards Brest-Litovsk.

In the 1st Russian Army, the 21st Army Corps could not withstand the German onslaught and retreated across the Narev River, followed by the 27th, 4th, 1st Siberian Army and 1st Cavalry Corps. Not hoping to stay on randomly busy lines. A. Litvinov ordered the army to withdraw on the night of August 15.

On August 15, the corps of the center and left wing of the army of M. von Gallwitz reached the Myanka River, repelling Russian counterattacks and capturing 2,900 prisoners.

On August 16, the Germans discovered the withdrawal of the 12th and 1st Russian armies to Białystok. Aerial reconnaissance showed that the outskirts of the city were fortifying, heavy artillery was delivered there. By evening, the troops of M. von Gallwitz reached the Narew River along the entire course.

On August 17, the Russian 2nd, 1st and 12th armies went on the offensive to push the enemy back from Białystok and Velsk. The strongest attacks were directed at the junction of the German 9th and 12th armies. The 2nd Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Division was driven back. In the sectors of other corps of the 12th Army and the 8th Army, the Russian offensive did not bring success, but the enemy was pressed to his trenches. From the decoded radiograms, the staff of M. von Gallwitz received information that the Russian troops were occupying defensive positions. Gallwitz believed that on the line between the Narew and the Bug, the Russian armies would create a strong defense for long-term resistance. He admitted that the attempt to envelop the Russian armies failed due to insufficient pressure on the near flanks.

On August 18, the Russian 1st, 2nd and 12th armies withdrew to new positions, leaving strong rearguards against the junction of the 12th and 8th armies of the enemy until noon. The pursuit began at noon, the German troops marched more than 13 km.

By the end of August 21, the troops of M. von Gallwitz reached the line east of Brest-Litovsk. Troops of the 9th Army took Kleszczele. The quartermaster general of the staff of the army group P. von Hindenburg, Lieutenant Colonel M. Hoffman, announced a new task set by the Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East: to reach the Riga-Grodno-Brest line.

On August 23-25, in stubborn battles with the Russian rearguards of the 1st, 2nd and 4th armies, the German troops advanced in the bend of the Narew and approached Białowieża Forest from the west.

On the night of August 26, the Russian troops retreated again, pursuing them, the German divisions occupied Białystok (37th division of the 8th army). On the same day, the Germans occupied Brest-Litovsk, set on fire during the retreat.

With the fall of Brest-Litovsk and Białystok, the Bug-Narew offensive came to an end.

Outcome

The staff of the Supreme Commander of All German Forces in the East stated the failure of attempts to encircle or encircle the Russian armies in front of the middle course of the Bug. The Russian armies of the center of the Northwestern Front withdrew beyond the Bug and Narew without losing contact with each other and not allowing a deep breakthrough of the German troops. At the same time, both German and especially Russian troops suffered heavy losses. The overexpenditure of a modest supply of shells began to affect the effectiveness of the Russian defense: by August, Russian troops had lost the ability to wage protracted battles. The result was the fall or abandonment of the belt of western fortresses, including the two most powerful - Kovno and Novogeorgievsk. This result was largely a consequence of the fighting on the left flank of the armies of the North-Western Front between the Vistula and the Bug, where the army group of August von Mackensen was advancing.[46]

References

  1. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, Русский фронт Первой мировой войны. Потери сторон 1915, 2022, p. 509-512
  2. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 509-512
  3. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 550, calculated on the basis: Armee-Verordnungsblaetter. Deutsche Verlustlisten. №615-1297. 02.08.1915— 06.12.1916. Berlin, 1915-1916.
  4. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 550, calculated on the basis of documents of the Russian military-historical archive:Ф. 2019. On. 1. Д. 44. Д. 136-137: Д. 63. Л. 180. 314-317: Д. 64. Л. 114-115: Д. 65. Л. 27-28: Д. 75. Л. 294: Д 130. Л. 13. 139-140. 177: Д. 131. Л. 93-94. 128: Ф. 2106. On. 1. Д. 427. Л. 47-49: Оп. 2. Д. 42. Л. 96-224: Д. 48. Л. 2-26. 55-59, 73: Ф. 2110. Оп. 2. Д. 90. 247-251, 253, 286-309. 381-394: Ф. 2152. Он. 2. Д. 193. Л. 83-112: Ф. 2189. On. I. Д. 470. Л. I: Ф. 2232. On. 1. Д. 298. Л. 23-159: Ф. 2248. On. 1. Д. 296. Л. 88-139: Ф. 2250. On. 1. Д. 554. J1. 38-174: Ф. 2254. On. 1. Д 271. Л. 4-11.298: Ф. 2266. On. 1. Д. 229. JI. 2-8. 22-34: Ф. 2277. On 1. Д. 324. Л. 3-151: Ф. 2363. Он. 2. Д. 76. Л. 67-113: Ф. 2374. Оп. 2. Д. 134. J1. 4. 25: Ф. 2518. On 1. Д. 510. Л. 492, 564: Ф. 2621. Оп. 2. Д. 39. Л. 6-11: Ф 2622. Оп. 2. Д. 60. J1. 3 8: Ф. 2712. Оп. 2. Д 479. Л. 83-99: Ф. 2745. On. 1. Д. 12. Л. 41-51: Ф. 2777. On. I. Д. 49. Д. 42-61: Ф. 2778. Он. 2. Д. 77. Л. 5, 35. 40-45; Ф. 2811. On. 1. Д. 58. Л I -38: Ф. 28Ы.ОП. I. Д.91.Л.2- 35: Ф. 2830. Он. I. Д. 33. Л. 2-18: Ф. 2838. On. 1. Д. 112. Л. 72 127: Ф. 2839. Он. 1. Д. 126. J1. 2-130: Ф. 2840. Он. 1. Д. 263. Л. 40-60: Д. 267. Л. М7: Ф. 28*11. On. I. Д. 138. Л. I 106: Ф. 2854. On. I. Д. 230. J1. 324: Ф. 2856. Он. 2. Д. 34. Л. 2:Ф. 2857 On. I. Д. 68. Л. 139; Ф. 2876 On. I. Д. 16 Л. 6-28: Ф. 2878. On. 1. Д. 1-7; Ф. 2879 On. 1. Д. 19. Л. 2-19; Ф. 2920. On. I. Д. 172. Л. 60-417; Ф. 2921. On. I. Д. 156. Л. 239-477; Ф. 2990. On. 1. Д. 4. Л. 1-6; Ф. 2991. On. I Д. 4. Л. 10-14; Ф. 2992. On. I . Д. 4. Л. 1^1; Ф. 2993. On. 1. Д. 7. Л. 4-10; Ф. 3266. On. 2. Д. 24. Л. 197; Ф. 3267. Оп. 2. Д. 11. Л. 5-19; Ф 3268. On. 2. Д. 38, Л. 15-80; Ф. 3335. On. I. Д. 32. Л. 24-73: Ф. 3336. Оп. 1.Д. 39. Л. 10-75; Ф 3337. On. 1. Д. 69. Л. 2-30; Д. 74. Л. 12-87: Ф. 3339. On. I. Д. 70. Л. 7-24; Д. 71. Л. 21-28: Ф 3340. On. I. Д. 58. Л. 2-22: Ф. 3341. On. I. Д. 31. Л. 5: Ф. 3342. On. 1. Д. 51. Л. 4-15; Ф. 3367. On. I. Д. 103. Л. 180-181: Ф. 3368. On. 1. Д. 20. Л. 1-13: Ф. 3369. On. 1. Д. 17. Л. 1-15: Ф. 3370. On. 1. Д. 32. Л. 14-32. 89-104; Ф. 3371. On. I. Д. 68. Л. 13-179; Д. 69. Л. 8-152: Ф. 3372.On. I. Д. 23. Л. 17-30: Ф. 3373. On. I. Д. 86. Л. 5-12: Ф. 3374. On. I. Д. 35. Л. 10-12. 26-28: Ф. 3375. On. I. Д. 43. Л. 4-14: Ф. 3376. On. I. Д. 104. Л. 10-41; Ф. 3377. On. 1. Д. 125. Л. 9-32:Ф. 3378. On. I. Д. 15. Л. 7-10; Ф. 3427. On. 1. Д. 20. Л. 7-53; Ф. 3428. On. I. Д. 16. Л. 20-108: Ф. 3429. On. I. Д. 42. Л. 4-56: Ф. 3432. On. I. Д. 31. Л. 14-79: Ф. 3434. On. I. Д. 38. Л. 4-34: Ф. 3439. On. I. Д. 24. Л. 2-74; Д. 25. Л. 3-23; Ф. 3440. On. I Д. 23. Л. 33: Ф. 3516. On. 1. Д. 170. Л. 433—442. 510-556: Ф. 16196. Оп. 1.Д.409. Л. 119-239; Д. 410 Л 121-271; Д. 411. Л. 246-418; Д. 412. Л. 120-183; Д. 423. Л. 141-190: Д. 432. Л. 81-93; Д. 433. Л. 175-184: Д. 460. Л. 291-293; Д. 461. Л. 222-227: Д. 462. Л. 11 7-119; Д. 463. Л. 244-259: Д. 746. Л. 348-429; Д. 764. Л. 242-313; Д. 798. Л. 271-274; Д. 801. Л. 44-241 Д. 802. Л. 155-278: Д. 880. Л. 25-72: Д. 881. Л. 216-274: Д. 882. Л. 1-3; Д. 895. Л. 157-211! Д. 897. Л. 218-298: Д. 926. Л. 36; Д. 1014. Л. 18-23; Д. 1036. Л. 146-152; Д. 1040. Л. 115-120 139-144; Д. 1108. Л. 15-21: Д. 1110. Л. 17-18: Д. 1135. Л. 21-23. 168-170; Д. 1136. Л. 138-151: Д. 1143. Л.28-47.102-111,194,244-249; Д. 1147. Л. 11-17. 82-84; Д. 1150. Л. 38.40-42 56. 80-94. 142-144: Д. 1152. Л. 20, 102-106: Д. 1153. Л. 48-56; Д. 1163. Л. 406-412; Д 116S Л. 92-94: Д. 1168. Л. 2-18; Д. 1169. Л. 189; Д. 1171. Л. 132-135. 251; Д. 1173. Л 36-39 180-189.349-354; Д. 1175. Л. 38-18.
  5. ^ Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Berlin. 1932. Bd. 8. p. 340-509
  6. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 520-570
  7. ^ Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Bd. VIII.,1932, p.264-265
  8. ^ Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Bd. VIII. p. 266
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  11. ^ Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Bd. VIII. p. 271
  12. ^ Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914-1918. Wien. 1932. Hd. II. p. 611-612
  13. ^ Gallwitz M., p. 268-269
  14. ^ Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Bd. VIII. p. 271, 279
  15. ^ Sanitaetsbericht ueber das Deutsche Heer, bd. III, Berlin 1934, p. 43-44
  16. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 510
  17. ^ Sanitaetsbericht ueber das Deutsche Heer, bd. III, Berlin 1934, s. 45
  18. ^ Г.К. Корольков, Праснышское сражение. Июль 1915, 1928, p. 60-74
  19. ^ Г.К. Корольков, Праснышское сражение. Июль 1915, 1928, p. 74-78
  20. ^ Gallwitz M. von, 1929, p. 281-282
  21. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 282-283
  22. ^ Gallwitz M. von., p. 284-285
  23. ^ Gallwitz M. von. Meine fuerertaetigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916. p. 286
  24. ^ Г.К. Корольков, Праснышское сражение. Июль 1915, 1928, p. 106, 108, 115-116
  25. ^ Gallwitz M. von., p. 287
  26. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, с. 524
  27. ^ Стратегический очерк войны 1914-1918,ч. 4, p. 77
  28. ^ Gallwitz M. von. Meine fuerertaetigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, 1929, p. 293-294
  29. ^ Gallwitz M. von. Meine fuerertaetigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, p. 301-302
  30. ^ Gallwitz M. von. Meine fuerertaetigkeit im Weltkriege 1914/1916, p. 298
  31. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 527
  32. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 303-304
  33. ^ Стратегический очерк войны 1914-1918,volume 4, p. 79
  34. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 307-308
  35. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 528
  36. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 307
  37. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 530
  38. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 530
  39. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 308-309
  40. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 310
  41. ^ Sanitaetsbericht ueber das Deutsche Heer (Deutsche Feld-und Besatzungsheer) im Weltkriege 1914/18. Bd. III. p. 45
  42. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 532
  43. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 312
  44. ^ Gallwitz M. von, p. 313
  45. ^ С.Г. Нелипович, 2022, p. 532
  46. ^ Вооруженные силы России в Первой Мировой войне,volume 2, p. 54

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