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Ground Combat Vehicle

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Ground Combat Vehicle
New GCV logo.png
Ground Combat Vehicle logo
TypeTracked or wheeled armored fighting vehicles
Place of originUnited States
Service history
In serviceCanceled
Production history
DesignerIndustry and US Army (Government Furnished E/I/M and synchronization)[1]
VariantsInfantry fighting vehicle

The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) was the United States Army's replacement program for armored fighting vehicles in Armored and Stryker brigade combat teams. The GCV was organized under the Follow On Incremental Capabilities Package of the BCT Modernization program. The first variant of the vehicle was to be prototyped in 2015 and fielded by 2017. It replaced the canceled Future Combat Systems, manned ground vehicles program.[2] The GCV program was cancelled in February 2014. Its replacement was the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle.[3]

Design

Specific design elements of the GCV were contracted out, though the Army designed the architecture and retained overall responsibility for synchronization. This contrasted with the former FCS manned ground vehicles program where contractors had more control over the design.[4] The GCV was to be networked and offer improved survivability, while using the state-of-the-art mobility and power management functions. The military released classified details of the FCS Manned Ground Vehicles program to interested contractors to be utilized in design proposals for the GCV. The GCV family was to be built around a common chassis.[5]

Network

The GCV was planned to be networked.

The GCV was to be operable with the current battle command control and communications suite but would gradually use a more state-of-the-art networked integration system known as the BCT Network. It would provide exportable electrical power, and a battery charging capability for external hardware including vehicles and electronics from the BCT Soldier subsystems. The system would be capable of integration with unmanned systems and dismounted soldiers.[6][7]

The Mounted Soldier System was to enhance situational awareness through wireless communications and input from vehicle sensors and external sources such as other vehicles.[8]

Electrical power

The IFV would provide exportable electrical power, and battery charging capability for soldier systems.[6]

Mobility

The GCV must have been transportable by cargo aircraft, rail, and ship. The Army required it to meet the availability rates of the current Stryker. The Army did not limit the vehicle by the dimensions of the C-130 Hercules, which, in the past, constrained many designs. Air mobility would be provided by the more spacious C-17 Globemaster III. The GCV was to have good cross-country mobility, with a baseline requirement of 30 mph off-road speed. The GCV should have delivered higher sustainability levels and consume less fuel than the Bradley or other vehicles of similar weight and power.[6] The military was accepting both tracked and wheeled designs.[9] The operational maintenance cost requirement of the GCV was up to $200 per mile, compared to $168 per mile for the M2 Bradley.[10]

In its standard configuration the IFV would have a crew of three and carry a squad of nine. The vehicle could be reconfigured to support casualty evacuation. The Army stated no preference as to whether the IFV should be tracked or wheeled but suggested that it be tracked due to the weight stemming from the requirements.[9][11]

Offensive capabilities

The Army wanted the vehicle to feature a commander's weapons station, autocannon, coaxial weapon, and an anti-tank guided missile system. The weapons suite had to be manually operable when damaged and the commander's weapon station had to incorporate a shield.[12] Additionally, a dismountable anti-armor weapon would be carried on board.[12] The Army also stated that the weapon suite would emphasize modularity, be able to defeat other IFVs, and provide non-lethal capability to enable use in civilian environments.[13][6]

In May 2012, the Army's Project Manager for Maneuver Ammunition System (PM MAS) began to emphasize the need for munitions suppliers to begin readying for GCV IFV ammunition needs. Solutions ranged from 25 mm to 50 mm, but 30x173mm was identified as "the most likely" design to meet lethality and stowed kill requirements. Specific requirements were for airburst capability to defeat infantry targets (with high explosive incendiary recognized as a "less effective alternative"), armor-piercing rounds to defeat material threats, and training ammunition for each tactical round. Potential candidates included five U.S. produced and three foreign-made rounds. On 7 August 2013, a sources sought announcement was made for a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement for 30x173 mm ammunition: 2,700 rounds of Mk 238 Mod 1 High Explosive Incendiary-Tracer (HEI-T); 2,000 rounds of Mk 258 Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot-Tracer (APFSDS-T); 2,000 rounds of Mk 268 Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot-Tracer (APFSDS-T); and 2,000 rounds of Mk 317 Target Practice Discarding Sabot-Tracer (TPDS-T). The announcement called for the cartridges to be compatible with the Bushmaster III weapon system, such as XM813 and/or Mk 44 Mod 1. All interested participants had to provide the ammo quantities and associated information before the end of March 2015.[14]

Countermeasures

The Army wanted the GCV to have a passive blast protection level equal to the MRAP and would utilize hit avoidance systems.[6] The Army wanted to install an active protection system on the Ground Combat Vehicle. BAE tested the Artis LLC Iron Curtain[15] and General Dynamics demonstrated a version of the Israeli Trophy system.[16] By incorporating an APS, the GCV would only need 18 tons of ballistic armor protection, compared to 52 tons of armor required without it. Developers were considering modular armor technology, with the ability to add on and remove armor plates depending on threat levels and mission requirements.[17]

The Mounted Soldier System would have been standard wear for GCV crew members.

The Mounted Soldier System (MSS) was being developed for GCV crew members.[12][8] Dismounted leaders will utilize the Ground Soldier Systems.[12]

Tactics

The Infantry Fighting Vehicle variant was intended to fill the infantry transport role in Heavy Brigade Combat Teams replacing the aging M113 APC, M2 Bradley, and M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle.[2][13] It was the U.S. Army's intention that the IFV replace the M113 APC in the near term, and the M2 Bradley and M1126 ICV in the midterm.[13][18]

In the U.S. Army, as part of the ongoing restructuring, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Brigades would have an arsenal of 62 IFV's, battalions would have 29, and platoons would have 4.[7][19] Platoons were to be led by platoon leader GCV which would be accompanied by platoon medic, forward observer, Radio Transmission Operator, and other attachments and would command three other GCVs.[7]

The Army placed importance on the GCV's ability to carry a full nine-man squad. Numerous Army studies have concluded that a squad, containing two fireteams, should be composed of nine to eleven soldiers. These numbers allow the squad to accomplish the fire and maneuver doctrine, and for squad resilience, lethality, and leader span of control. The M2 Bradley cannot carry a complete squad from one vehicle, creating risk when transitioning from mounted to dismounted operations. The Bradley's lower carrying capacity was accepted for greater (than previous vehicles) mounted lethality and cost savings, leading to squads being broken apart for transport. A GCV with a nine-man squad would have allowed the squad leader to control and communicate with the squad while mounted, simplify the transition to dismounted operations in complex terrain, and allow the squad to conduct independent fire and maneuver immediately upon dismount. Replacing the Bradley on a one-for-one basis would have four GCVs per mechanized infantry platoon carrying one full nine-man squad in a single vehicle, with three vehicles carrying squads and one carrying the platoon's organic and attached enablers.[20]

Development

Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Peter Chiarelli hosts the second industry day.

In June 2009, a blue-ribbon panel met in Washington, D.C., to discuss requirements for the Ground Combat Vehicle.[21] In October and November 2009, more than 100 defense contractors turned up for two U.S. Army-organized industry day events in Michigan to express interest in bidding on the vehicle.[22][23] A review required for continuation was held and passed in February 2010 in Washington D.C.[24][25] A request for proposals (RFP) was issued on 25 February 2010 to which companies had 60 days to respond,[25] but was extended an additional 25 days.[26] A committee examined the schedule for the GCV to "shave a little time off".[27] For fiscal year 2011, the U.S. Army wished to spend $934 million of the $2.5 billion allocated for BCT Modernization to develop the GCV.[28]

Up to three competitive contracts were to be awarded by early fall.[9][29] A prototype development contract decision would have followed by 2013.[30] The Technology Development Phase (or Milestone A) would begin in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2010 with the award of up to three vehicle contracts. This was to be followed by an Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase before full production could start.[31]

Nine vehicles were evaluated in the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). The four primary vehicles included in the AOA were the M2A3 Bradley II, a modernized Stryker, an M2A3 Bradley variant used in Iraq, and a XM1230 Caiman Plus MRAP. The five secondary vehicles included two unnamed foreign-made platforms, the M1126 Stryker Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the M1A2 SEP TUSK Abrams, and a modernized M1 Abrams. Vehicles included the AOA were determined to be inferior to the planned GCV.[32]

On 25 August 2010, the U.S. Army canceled the original RFP to revise the requirements.[33] A new RFP was to be issued 60 days later.[34][35] When Peter Chiarelli was asked if the Army was developing an alternative to the GCV, Chiarelli replied "We're totally committed to GCV."[36] The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform suggested deferring development of the GCV until after 2015.[37]

In August 2011, technology development contracts were awarded to BAE Systems Land & Armaments for $449.9 million and General Dynamics Land Systems for $439.7M.[38][unreliable source?]

Budget concerns and proposed cuts

In December 2012, it was reported that the Army may need to cut $150 million from the GCV program in 2014, with deeper cuts between $600–700 million between 2014 and 2018. This put the program, one of the Army's highest priorities, at serious risk. With the drawdown of the War in Afghanistan and budgetary concerns, the expensive development of a new combat vehicle was not seen as feasible. BAE Systems and General Dynamics were each awarded engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase contracts in August 2011. The EMD phase was to last 48 months for both contractors, but there were arguments for only one to proceed as a cost-saving measure. This would present the problem of selecting a vehicle based on design outlines, rather than on real prototypes. Another suggestion was to lengthen the EMD period to allow for smaller contract awards over time. This might delay the operational deadline beyond the planned 2018 date. The underlying concern is the fact that the Army plans to spend 80 percent of its ground combat vehicle budget on GCV development from 2013-2018. With 1,847 GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicles expected to be acquired, they would make up only 10 percent of the Army combat vehicle fleet. Redirected funds could be shifted to modernization efforts for the combat-proven Stryker, M1 Abrams, and Bradley families of vehicles.[39]

Revision

The GCV acquisition strategy was revised on 17 January 2013 to further reduce risk and maintain affordability of the program. The revision extended the technology development phase by six months to give industry more time to refine vehicle designs. Milestone B would occur in 2014, with the selection of a single vendor for the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) and production phases of the program. This would initiate critical design and testing activities in anticipation of vehicle production. Budgetary pressures caused the reduction of number of vendors to be selected from two to one.[40]

CBO report

On 2 April 2013, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a report on the progress of the GCV program. The report questioned the program, estimated to cost $28 billion from 2014–2030, with the possibility of alternate vehicle options. While none met overall Army goals desired in the GCV, they offered advantages in being less costly and delayed. Planned GCV prototypes were heavy, weighing up to 84 tons, to be better protected and seat a nine-man squad. Officials said that a vehicle of that size would not be well suited to operations faced in Iraq or Afghanistan. Alternate vehicles would be cheaper and more maneuverable in urban settings. The CBO report analyzed four alternative options:[41][42]

  • Purchase the Namer APC – Seats 9 soldiers with combat survival rates expected slightly higher than the GCV, and costs $9 billion less. The Namer has less ability to destroy other enemy vehicles and is less mobile. Production would be conducted in part domestically, but fielding would require collaboration with foreign companies and governments.
  • Upgrade the Bradley IFV – An upgraded Bradley would be more lethal than the GCV against enemy forces and would probably survive combat at about the same rates as would the GCV, saving $19.8 billion. Upgrading the Bradley would make it "significantly more capable" than the GCV. The Bradley still only carries a 7-man squad and has less mobility.
  • Purchase the Puma (IFV) – More lethal than the GCV, combat survival and protection at better rates, and just as mobile. Purchasing the Puma would save $14.8 billion and was considered the most capable of the vehicles. Puma IFVs only carry six infantrymen, which would require five vehicles to replace every four Bradleys. Development and production would require collaboration with foreign companies and governments.
  • Cancel the Ground Combat Vehicle – If the Army reconditioned its current Bradley instead of replacing them, the current capability of the IFV fleet could be maintained through 2030. The Army could continue to investigate ways to improve the current Bradleys, but it would not field any new or improved vehicles. The $24 billion saved in funding could be used on other programs.

General Dynamics and BAE Systems, who received contracts in the Ground Combat Vehicle program, criticized the CBO report, saying they used the wrong vehicle in its analysis. Officials from both companies said they used the wrong notional model of the GCV that did not account for the change in requirements made by the Army or the advancements made in the technology development phase of the program. They also criticized the comparisons of the other vehicles. The report factored cost, survivability, mobility, and lethality, ranking the GCV's capabilities as lower than all others. The Army questioned the suitability of existing design. An Army test of currently fielded vehicles in 2012 revealed that some met critical GCV requirements, but none met enough without needing significant redesign. They also note that lethality was judged with a 25 mm cannon for analysis, before the Army planned to mount a 30 mm cannon. The CBO report did give credit to cost, assuming the Army's goal of $13 million per vehicle. However, Pentagon cost assessments estimated the price at $16–$17 million per vehicle.[43]

Funding cut and prioritization

On 29 July 2013, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno warned that the Ground Combat Vehicle program might be delayed or possibly even cancelled because of the sequestration budget cuts. Although he specifically said it could be delayed, he did not rule out the possibility of cancellation. The GCV was high-priority for the Army to give better protection than the M2 Bradley, but because of the sequester cuts everything was being considered. On 1 August 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel outlined two basic results if the effects of sequestration continued: modernization programs like the GCV would be cut to maintain troop levels, or high-end capability efforts like the GCV would be preserved to continue modernization and keep equipment technologically advanced with troop levels being cut. Odierno was committed to balancing soldiers, readiness, and modernization, and was intent on the need for the Ground Combat Vehicle. Suggested alternative options, such as further upgrading the Bradley and buying currently available infantry fighting vehicles like the German Puma, were recommended as cost-saving measures. Army leaders said the Puma's low troop-carrying capacity would require buying five vehicles to replace every four Bradleys, and that upgrading the Bradley would essentially be engineering a new vehicle. While these options would offer no improvement over the fleet's current capability, not pursuing the GCV would allow the money to be spent elsewhere.[44][45]

Some reports[clarification needed] suggested that the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle program to replace the M113 family of vehicles was being favored over the GCV program. While procurement of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) fleet would cost over $5 billion, the Government Accountability Office estimated the GCV fleet would cost $37 billion. In April 2013, the Congressional Budget Office said the AMPV would be a better buy because analysts had asserted that the vehicles the GCV was slated to replace should not be first. The GCV would replace 61 M2 Bradley IFVs per armored combat brigade, making up 18 percent of the 346 armored combat vehicles in each armored brigade. A 24 September 2013 Congressional Research Service report suggested that given budgetary constraints, the GCV program may be unrealistic, and that one potential discussion could focus on a decision by the Army to replace the GCV with the AMPV as their number one ground combat vehicle acquisition priority.[46]

Army leaders say having a large ground army is still necessary for deterrence and "regime change" operations. They also realize that their equipment will be mostly modernized versions of current equipment for the rest of the decade. Technologies from the GCV program are being explored, although development and procurement of a vehicle is not. By mid-November 2013, both BAE and General Dynamics designs had passed Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR), but neither company had commenced building prototypes. The Army was increasingly willing to slow down the GCV program or push it back from EMD to research and development. While the Army had said previously that it was their highest priority acquisition program, they had since shifted their main modernization priority to an integrated electronic command network. Short-term incremental upgrades will be applied to existing weapons systems to keep them from becoming obsolete, and advanced technologies available in the future will be used to build entirely new systems when funding is restored.[47]

On 15 January 2014, a spending bill passed by the House appropriated $100 million for the GCV program, even though the Army had requested $592 million for the program for FY 2014. The Army planned to spend 80 percent of its ground vehicle modernization budget on the GCV over the next five years, with costs ranging from $29–34 billion depending on overruns and setbacks. Several options were being considered to make the program more affordable, including reducing the squad size from their optimum goal of nine men and using new emerging, and undeveloped, technologies to reduce the weight of the vehicle to 30 tons for operations in urban environments.[48] The two contractors would run out of money for development of their prototype vehicles by June 2014 unless the Army funded the rest of the technology development phase. The Pentagon and Army tried to find ways to continue the program, without actually starting vehicle production, through new technologies like advanced fire control systems and hybrid engines. Although the Army wanted 1,894 Ground Combat Vehicles with a target price of $9–10.5 million per unit, the Pentagon's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation estimated a unit cost of up to $17 million.[49] The 83-percent cut in funding essentially scaled back the GCV program to a research effort. The program had declined in support over the past months with the Army determining that the desired vehicle was no longer feasible in the near term due to budget reductions, suspicion from the contractors that the program would not move past technology development, and Congress's believing it would not succeed.[50]

In a speech on 23 January 2014, General Ray Odierno confirmed that the Ground Combat Vehicle program was being put on hold due to budget difficulties. He said that the Army needed a new IFV but that they could not afford one at the time. Odierno said that he was pleased with the requirements for the vehicle and that progress and development with the contractors was good. "Leap-ahead technologies" that make the vehicle light and mobile while still being protected against RPGs and roadside bombs are still desired. In the past decade, mobility was traded for protection, but Army war games caused the service to decide it will need small, mobile formations to be deployed quickly in the future, and recent conflicts showed the need for expeditionary forces to be transported quickly to remote areas in small packages with as little support as possible; weight estimates of 70 tons for the GCV IFV did not make it easily deployable. The Army may direct some funds for technology development so it can start another program within "three to four years."[51] Science and technology investments were to be made to address the size and weight of armored ground vehicles to make it easier and cheaper to transport greater numbers of them across the world.[52]

Weight issues

In November 2012, estimates of the GCV's weight, depending on armor packages, put the General Dynamics entry vehicle at 64–70 tons, and the BAE Systems entry vehicle at 70–84 tons. This made the planned infantry fighting vehicle designs heavier than the M1 Abrams tank. The reason was the vehicle had to have enough armor to protect a squad of nine troops from all battlefield threats (from rocket-propelled grenades to IEDs) as good as or better than other vehicles can protect against specific threats individually. This worked against the vehicle; as weight increases, cost goes up and maneuverability goes down. The contractors worked to bring the weight down.[53] The Army maintained that heavy armor was needed to protect the squad from acceleration forces that come with an underside blast, and that thicker underbelly plates and V-shaped hulls do not give enough protection. More armor would come from the vehicle being larger for more internal space for the soldiers, and to allow for features such as floating floors for blast deflection and extra headroom. The Army also said heavy weight would not affect deployability because the Bradley it was planned to replace already requires strategic airlift transport aircraft.[54]

Both contractors claimed their designs were below the 70–84 tons expectation of what the GCV will weigh. BAE's vehicle weighed 60–70 tons, based on modular armor package, and a 20 percent margin for weight increase the Army had planned for future upgrades would bring it up to 84 tons. General Dynamic's vehicle with a diesel engine weighed 62 tons in its most heavily armored configuration, which increased to 76 tons with the 20 percent future upgrade margin. Removing protection for easier air transportation would have reduced it to 56 tons. The Army's consideration to slow down the GCV development program gave time to the companies to refine their designs and reduce weight. One way would have been to reduce squad size. A nine-man squad has been identified as best for being able to fight with the possibility of taking casualties with single-vehicle transportability. With a three-man crew, the GCV had to carry 12 men. A greater number of lighter IFVs that carry fewer soldiers would have similar carrying capacity and combined costs and weight to planned GCV numbers. Another way would be an advance in armor designs. Lighter and stronger armor materials had not made radical progressions in recent history, and domestic active protection intercept systems were not yet mature. Foreign systems like the Israeli Trophy had seen combat but cannot yet intercept tank shells. The GCV program originally included an APS, but was then delayed as a feature for later upgrades. The last effort to replace the Bradley had been Future Combat Systems from 2003 to 2009, which developed a vehicle that relied on sensors to avoid danger and an APS in place of heavy armor. It was too ambitious for the time and the vehicle's weight had grown from 19 tons to 30 tons by the time it was cancelled.[55]

Termination

The Pentagon FY 2015 budget proposal unveiled on 24 February 2014 cancelled the GCV program.[56] Army acquisition executive Heidi Shyu said that criticism of the program was "unfortunate" and cancelling it had nothing to do with vehicle performance. She said the program had been doing "remarkably well" and wasn't having technical issues, and that the contracts were being executed well. The decision to cancel development was based entirely on budget calculations, with no possible way to come up with funds no matter how many other areas were reduced. Money will be redistributed to engineering change proposals (ECP) on existing platforms until budget difficulties pass to allow investment in next-generation capabilities in about seven years.[57]

The decision had to be made to either exclusively fund the GCV or ECPs, so upgrades were chosen for the Bradley, Abrams, Stryker, and M109 Paladin fleets to have them more combat-capable in the near-term, should they be needed for an international situation. Vehicles like the Bradley and Abrams have been upgraded since the 1980s with new armor, sensors, and other gear that have maxed out the platforms for further horsepower and electrical advances, so the requirement for an entirely new ground combat vehicle built from the outset from lessons learned in combat from the previous decade remains.[58] The Army's own budget proposal unveiled on 4 March discontinued the program, and instead funds were shifted to the AMPV program as the main vehicle priority and to improving the Bradley IFV in the interim until more resources become available.[59][60] Incremental improvements will be made to current vehicle fleets to improve protection and networking abilities. $131 million will be directed into science and technology to look at the feasibility of future combat vehicle technologies, and Secretary Hagel has directed the Army, as well as the Marine Corps, to deliver "realistic" visions for vehicle modernization by the end of FY 2014.[61]

The cancellation of the GCV is the second time in 15 years an Army program to replace the Bradley has failed. FCS ran from 1999 to 2009, with the Manned Ground Vehicles portion for replacing several armored vehicle classes costing "hundreds of millions" of dollars out of $20 billion total. From 2010 to 2014, the Army spent over $1 billion on the GCV. Although there was criticism that vehicle weight could not be kept at a reasonable level while meeting its size and power requirements, the Army maintains the official reason for the cancellation was budgetary pressures. BAE Systems and General Dynamics will each receive $50 million in FY 2015 to continue technology development. The next follow-up IFV development program is currently named the Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV).[3]

Continued technology development

On 18 July 2014, BAE and General Dynamics were awarded $7.9 million study contracts for technical, cost, and risk assessments to salvage subsystems and other technologies created under the GCV for use in the FFV system. General Dynamics will utilize the GCV integrated propulsion and mobility subsystems Automotive Test Rig (ATR), and the conventional drive integrated propulsion subsystem, while BAE will utilize the GCV TD phase integrated hybrid-electric propulsion and mobility subsystems ATR and the hybrid-electric integrated propulsion subsystem (Hotbuck).[62][63]

Variants

Artist's impression of the GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle

The Army was using an incremental approach to combat vehicle modernization, centered on the Ground Combat Vehicle. The deployment was to be synchronized with upgrades, reset, and divestiture of existing vehicles. Vehicles displaced by the IFV may then replace selected M113 family of vehicles such as command and control, medical evacuation, and mortar carrier, allowing the Army to begin divestiture of the M113 family of vehicles. Upgrades to existing Bradley and Stryker vehicles may have been considered as risk mitigation based on the rate at which the GCV was introduced.[64][65] Although upgraded, the Bradley and Stryker would also be replaced in the midterm.[64]

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

The Infantry Fighting Vehicle superseded the previous infantry carrier replacement effort, the XM1206 Infantry Carrier Vehicle of the FCS MGV program.[2] It was the U.S. Army's intention that the IFV replace the M113 APC by 2018, the M2 Bradley later, and the Stryker ICV in the midterm.[64][66] The IFV was to hold a crew of three and a squad of nine.[9]

Competitors

BAE Systems

The BAE Systems Ground Combat Vehicle design had a steel-core hull and an integrated electronic network capability with embedded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment. Its turret was unmanned. The centerpiece of the vehicle was its simplified drive train. It was propelled by a Hybrid Electric Drive (HED), which was developed by Northrop Grumman, that produced 1,100 kW of electricity. Advantages to it are fewer components and lower volume and weight compared to current power plants. The transmission was 40 percent smaller and the drive train had half the moving parts. The hybrid drive train cost 5 percent more than a mechanical system, but had a 20 percent reduction in life-cycle cost. The electric drive allows for smoother low-speed operation and less noise. The vehicle burned 20 percent less fuel while running, with 4.61 gallons (17.45 liters) per hour used while stationary. It had a top speed of 43 mph (70 km/h), could go from 0 to 20 mph (32.18 km/hr) in 7.8 seconds, and had a range of 186 mi (299 km) with a 255-gallon fuel capacity. Disadvantages to the BAE design included a weight of 70 tons and fuel efficiency of only 0.73 mpg. It was argued that big, heavy vehicles are not practical in urban combat and that the infrastructure of urban and third-world countries should limit the vehicle's weight to 45 tons. Others said that urban warfare tactics have become so lethal that only vehicles of this size can survive.[67][68] BAE integrated the Artis Iron Curtain active protection system to defeat incoming rockets and missiles before they can hit the vehicle. The Army conducted tests on the system in April 2013, and it successfully passed all tests.[69] A prototype system for the vehicle to drive in low visibility conditions was also tested. A Humvee with blacked-out windows drove through a smoke-filled mock town with the system safely, even though visibility was completely obscured.[70] In August 2013, the BAE GCV's hybrid electric drive completed 2,000 miles of testing on a fully integrated “Hotbuck” mobility platform. The Hotbuck is a stationary test stand that simulates real-life environments and terrain and puts actual miles on the HED system. Under BAE's own timeline, the testing was completed four months ahead of schedule. Developing and testing actual hardware was not a program requirement for the Technology Development (TD) phase, but BAE Systems chose to demonstrate the fuel efficiency and performance of a hybrid system.[71]

Although dramatic funding cuts for the GCV program in January 2014 put the very completion of the acquisition effort in jeopardy, funding remained for research on a hybrid-electric propulsion system. The BAE GCV's hybrid-electric engine is more fuel efficient, has fewer moving parts, and has faster acceleration than ordinary engines. While powering a vehicle concept that reached 70 tons proved impractical, its benefits of providing power for onboard electronics, silent overwatch, and short, stealthy movements are still promising. BAE has pledged to support future Army developmental efforts with technologies from their GCV entry.[72] On 18 July 2014, BAE Systems was awarded a $7.9 million study contract for technical, cost, and risk assessments to utilize the GCV TD phase integrated hybrid-electric propulsion and mobility subsystems Automotive Test Rig (ATR) and the hybrid-electric integrated propulsion subsystem (Hotbuck) for the Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV) effort.[62][63]

General Dynamics

On 31 October 2013, General Dynamics successfully completed a preliminary design review of their GCV IFV design. Subsystem and component design reviews were held from August to October of that year and led to the four-day PDR. General Dynamics demonstrated their vehicle met Tier 1 affordability, reliability, and other requirements. The success of the PDR meant that the General Dynamics GCV IFV could be expected to be operationally effective and suitable.[73]

See also

Vehicles

References

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